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I. Introduction 
What does “corporate democracy” mean? How far does federal 
law go to guarantee public company investors a say in a firm’s 
policies on important social, environmental, or political issues? In 
1972, the U.S. Supreme Court appeared ready to start sketching 
the contours of corporate democracy—and then, at the last minute, 
it pulled back. This Article tells the story of Securities and 
Exchange Commission v. Medical Committee for Human Rights,1 
in which a national civil rights organization, best known for its 
work at civil rights marches and protests, fought to expand the 
limits of corporate democracy and nearly succeeded.2 
Between March 1968 and January 1972, Medical Committee 
for Human Rights waged a protracted battle with a major 
American company and the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) over its rights as a shareholder.3 Medical 
Committee became the first civil society organization to pursue 
social change within a public company using shareholders’ tools, 
by submitting a shareholder proposal to Dow Chemical Company 
under SEC Rule 14a-8.4 That rule, rarely used by stockholders 
until the late 1960s and almost never for social, political, or 
environmental reform, required reporting companies to publish a 
shareholder’s proposal in the proxy statement in advance of a full 
shareholder vote.5 Medical Committee’s proposal, first submitted 
to Dow in 1968, addressed the company’s manufacture of napalm, 
                                                                                                     
 1. 404 U.S. 403 (1972).  
 2. See generally, id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1969).  
 5. See id. (addressing when a company must include a shareholder proposal 
in its proxy statement).  
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a chemical sold by Dow to the U.S. government for use in the 
Vietnam War.6  
Dow rejected Medical Committee’s proposal, and the SEC 
approved the company’s decision. Medical Committee won an early 
and important battle in the fight in 1970, however, when the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
issued a “pathbreaking” decision in its favor.7 A unanimous, 
three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit sided with Medical 
Committee and suggested that the napalm proposal should have 
gone to a shareholder vote.8 The D.C. Circuit’s surprising decision, 
authored by the conservative federal judge Edward Allen  
Tamm—who, five years later, would write an influential 
dissenting opinion in Buckley v. Valeo,9 in which he argued that 
First Amendment protection should apply to political  
                                                                                                     
 6. Napalm B (herein referred to simply as “napalm”) was a jellied form of 
gasoline made with polystyrene, benzene, and gasoline. See ROBERT M. NEER, 
NAPALM: AN AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 116 (2013). As one contemporaneous writer put 
it, napalm was “the most popular bomb in Vietnam, because it is both cheap and 
deadly: a mixture of low grade jet fuel and gelignite which sticks to anything it 
touches and burns with such heat that all oxygen in the area is exhausted within 
a split second. Death is either by roasting or suffocation.” Alan Williams, Tons of 
Destruction, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1966, at E5. Polystyrene, a key component of 
napalm, had been created by Dow and trademarked as “Styrofoam.” NEER, supra 
at 116. Medical Committee’s proposal went through two versions. The first would 
have required an amendment to Dow’s certificate of incorporation “that napalm 
shall not be sold to any buyer unless that buyer gives reasonable assurance that 
the substance will not be used on or against human beings.” The second requested 
that Dow’s board “consider the advisability of adopting a resolution setting forth 
an amendment to the composite certificate of incorporation of the Dow Chemical 
Company that the company shall not make napalm.” See infra notes 17–42 and 
accompanying text. 
 7. Donald S. Chisum, Napalm, Proxy Proposals and the SEC, 12 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 463, 463 (1970) (describing how the case “shatter[ed] past assumptions about 
the reviewability of informal SEC action and about the scope of the SEC 
shareholder proposal rule”).  
 8. Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), 
vacated 404 U.S. 403 (1972). As explained in more detail in Part III, the D.C. 
Circuit held that the SEC’s no-action decision was judicially reviewable and sent 
the matter back to the SEC for “more illuminating consideration and decision” 
about whether Rule 14a-8 required Dow to publish Medical Committee’s proposal. 
Id. at 676. However, the D.C. Circuit also expressed skepticism about the 
proposal’s excludability and articulated an expansive view of corporate 
democracy. See id. 
 9. 519 F.2d 821, 912–922 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Tamm, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part), overruled by 424 U.S. 1 (1976).  
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spending10—framed Medical Committee for Human Rights v. 
SEC11 as a case about corporate democracy. It was the first time 
the phrase “corporate democracy” had been used in the federal 
courts in the D.C. Circuit. 
Ultimately, Medical Committee’s fight reached the U.S. 
Supreme Court, where it was billed as one of the term’s major 
cases. Then, when the SEC introduced a last-minute legal 
argument, Justice Thurgood Marshall authored an opinion 
declaring the case moot, and Medical Committee’s gains for 
corporate democracy were lost.12 
Medical Committee’s activism took place at the intersection of 
major strands in American history: the struggle for civil rights, 
which had reached a crescendo in 1968; the corporate social 
responsibility movement, which was then in its infancy; the 
Supreme Court’s consistent reluctance to impede U.S. military 
action in Vietnam; and the end of the New Deal regulatory 
philosophy at the SEC. As civil rights history, the story never 
received much attention.13 As corporate law history, it has largely 
receded from memory. Yet the case marks the beginning of a 
period, spanning decades and reaching the current day, in which 
the contours of corporate democracy have remained vague and 
contested. Over the same period, the Supreme Court has used the 
existence of corporate democracy to justify an expansion of 
corporate rights.  
Recently, the story has received some renewed attention as a 
precursor to twenty-first-century campaigns of shareholder 
activism, such as the recent push by Amazon.com stockholders to 
end the company’s practice of selling facial recognition software to 
law enforcement.14 Like Medical Committee and others who 
                                                                                                     
 10. See infra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Tamm). 
 11. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated 404 U.S. 403 (1972).  
 12. See SEC v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 406 (1972). 
Although the Supreme Court’s decision vacated the D.C. Circuit’s opinion below, 
the D.C. Circuit’s analysis continued to be influential. See infra Part IV.  
 13. For example, John Dittmer’s history of Medical Committee includes only 
a few paragraphs about the organization’s trailblazing efforts in shareholder 
activism. JOHN DITTMER, THE GOOD DOCTORS: THE MEDICAL COMMITTEE FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE IN HEALTH CARE 77–78 
(2009).  
 14. See Kevin Roose, Why Napalm Is a Cautionary Tale for Tech Giants 
Pursuing Military Contracts, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2019), 
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pursued shareholder activism in the late 1960s as an extension of 
their political activism, twenty-first-century investors have begun 
ramping up shareholder activism. Then, as now, activists have 
turned to private governance when the institutions of democratic 
governance have proved unresponsive to popular will. In the 
twenty-first century, the public company again has become a focal 
point of democratically-minded activism. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Following the 
introduction, Part II tells the story of how a civil rights 
organization advanced the cause of shareholder activism in the 
late 1960s. It begins with the group’s first, clumsy efforts to use 
shareholder tools and traces developments through the 
tumultuous 1970 proxy season, in which major companies’ annual 
meetings featured confrontations involving police, private security 
forces, guard dogs, and rock-throwing stockholders. Archival 
documents reveal that a Yale law student was the original donor 
of five shares of Dow Chemical Company stock to Medical 
Committee, and that he helped connect the civil rights 
organization to the prominent securities lawyers who litigated its 
case. An important victory came early: Dow stopped 
manufacturing napalm in May 1969, around the time of its annual 
shareholders meeting. However, Dow’s management never 
admitted any concession to the investor insurgency. 
Part III describes the legal wrangling that took place in the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and ultimately the U.S. Supreme 
Court. This Part excavates primary documents from the case files 
of Supreme Court Justices involved in the case, including those of 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, who wrote the opinion that declared 
the controversy moot, and Justice William O. Douglas, the former 
New Deal SEC Chair, who departed from his longstanding practice 
of recusing himself from securities law cases to dissent. What these 
documents suggest is that, if it had been decided on the merits, 
SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights would have been a 
close case. This is especially noteworthy considering that two of the 
nine Justices who were members of the Court when it granted 
certiorari—Justices Hugo Black and John Marshall Harlan—had 
                                                                                                     
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/04/technology/technology-military-
contracts.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2019) (reporting that the “reputational 
damage” Dow suffered from the napalm campaign “haunted the company for 
decades”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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resigned for health reasons by the time the case was argued. In the 
end, Medical Committee saw its gains for corporate democracy 
dissolved as fierce maneuvering by Dow’s corporate management 
and the SEC won the upper hand. 
Part IV considers the significance of SEC v. Medical 
Committee for Human Rights to history. It presents the case as 
civil rights history, as securities law history, and as corporate 
governance history, and offers some reflections on the case in light 
of the current debate about the right of shareholders to have a 
voice in a company’s manufacture or sale of controversial products.  
II. Dow and the Dissenting Shareholder 
“War Is Good for Business: Invest Your Son.”15 
 
Medical Committee for Human Rights was an organization of 
physicians, medical students, and other health professionals 
created to oppose segregation in medicine and to advance the civil 
rights movement.16 The group emerged on the national stage 
during the Freedom Summer of 1964 when it provided direct 
medical assistance at protests and marches. By 1966, it had 
seventeen chapters across the U.S.17 It had become “the health arm 
                                                                                                     
 15. This “familiar” anti-war slogan was displayed by protestors at Dow’s 
1969 annual shareholders meeting. Dow Chemical to Bid on Another Contract for 
Supplying Napalm, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1969, at 18.  
 16. Martia Graham Goodson & Aaron O. Wells, Aaron O. Wells, MD and the 
Medical Committee for Human Rights: Reflections on a Life of Conscience, 96 J. 
OF NAT’L MED. ASSOCS. 1519, 1519 (2004). 
 17. DITTMER, supra note 13, at 35–36. Dr. Aaron O. Wells, a founder of 
Medical Committee, recalled that the organization received a telegram from 
Martin Luther King Jr. before the 1964 Freedom Summer, asking for the 
organization’s assistance. Goodson & Wells, supra note 16, at 1522. Dr. Wells 
“went on national television to appeal to physicians and nurses across the nation 
to come to Mississippi, where we were going to act as a medical umbrella for the 
civil rights workers.” Id. Medical Committee’s first national convention took place 
in 1965 at Howard University, where the New York physician Wells was elected 
its first president. QUENTIN YOUNG, EVERYBODY IN, NOBODY OUT 73 (2013). 
Quentin Young became Medical Committee’s third president in 1967 and served 
as its national chairman for much of the period from 1968 to 1972 when Medical 
Committee’s battle with Dow played out. YOUNG, supra, at 75; see also Austin C. 
Wehrwein, South’s Hospitals Face Rights Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1966, at 54. 
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of the civil rights movement and the civil rights arm of the health 
professions.”18  
In early 1967, when the civil rights movement embraced the 
peace movement to oppose the Vietnam War, Medical Committee 
also pivoted. Dr. Quentin Young, a white physician from Chicago 
and Medical Committee’s national chairman when the group 
began its battle with Dow, wrote that Medical Committee’s 
leadership struggled with the decision to oppose the Vietnam 
War.19 On April 4, 1967, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. gave a historic 
speech at Riverside Church in New York City about the Vietnam 
War. Titled “Beyond Vietnam: A Time to Break Silence,” his speech 
called for a “genuine revolution in values” and pushed activists to 
seek out “every creative method of protest possible.”20 After King’s 
speech, Medical Committee passed a formal resolution calling for 
an end to the Vietnam War, and Young received a letter from King 
in support of Medical Committee’s position.21  
                                                                                                     
 18. Irving Spiegel, Powell Critical of Aid to Chicago, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 
1965, at 25. 
 19. See YOUNG, supra note 17, at 75–76  
As President Johnson escalated the war in Vietnam some in our 
organization wanted us to oppose the conflict and call for withdrawal 
from military activity in Asia . . . Led by a charismatic Californian 
named Bill Bronston, the younger members of MCHR, medical 
students in particular, argued that the organization’s silence on the 
war was antithetical to our mission to eliminate segregation. They 
cited the disparity between the draft status of young white and black 
men. 
Young himself initially did not believe that Medical Committee should publicly 
oppose the war. See id. (“I didn’t disagree with the facts, but initially I did 
disagree with the tactics. . . . [M]any of us believed it was not fair for us as an 
adjunct to the black movement to create a problem for it by taking an 
organizational stance against the war.”). Young recalled that Dr. Martin Luther 
King Jr.’s famous 1967 speech at Riverside Church put the issue to rest.  
 20. See, e.g., Daniel S. Lucks, Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Riverside Speech and 
Cold War Civil Rights, 40 PEACE & CHANGE 395, 395 (2015) (noting that Dr. King’s 
speech was controversial). 
 21. According to Young, Dr. King wrote to him that “[w]e must continue to 
raise our voices loudly and clearly to end this tragic war.” YOUNG, supra note 17, 
at 76. Medical Committee also joined the Council of Health Organizations, an 
anti-war coalition of medical organizations, to run health clinics for men facing 
the draft. Id. “Our goal was to level the playing field, giving young people with 
limited or no medical history this service and a fair physical exam.” Id. at 77. 
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A. A Donation and a Proposal 
In 1968, Medical Committee received a gift of five shares of 
Dow Chemical Company stock from a Yale Law student, L. 
Geoffrey Cowan.22 Cowan was the son of Louis Cowan, a former 
president of the Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS), and 
Pauline Spiegel Cowan, an heir to the Spiegel Catalog company 
and a civil rights activist.23 Cowan graduated from Yale a few 
months after making the gift and went on to found the Center for 
Law and Social Policy. He would continue to play a shadow role in 
Medical Committee’s shareholder activism at Dow.24 In a letter 
thanking Cowan for his donation, Quentin Young expressed 
concern about Dow’s production of napalm, and noted that Medical 
Committee’s Executive Committee was discussing the matter.25 
Medical Committee sent its first shareholder proposal to Dow five 
days later.26 
                                                                                                     
 22. See Letter from Quentin D. Young, Medical Committee for Human 
Rights, to L. Geoffrey Cowan (March 6, 1968) (on file with author & Univ. of Penn. 
Archives, Coll. 641, Folder 421) (“It gives me great pleasure to acknowledge your 
generous gift . . . .”); DITTMER, supra note 13, at 176. Assuming that Dow’s stock 
was valued at roughly $70 per share in 1968 dollars (it closed a little above $70 
on March 5, 1968), the shares would have been worth roughly $2,600 at the time, 
in 2019 dollars. N.Y.S.E. Stock chart, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 1968, at 32. 
 23. See Louis Cowan Killed with Wife in a Fire; Created Quiz Shows, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 19, 1976, at 1 (describing Louis Cowan’s creation of “The $64,000 
Question” for CBS and Pauline Spiegel Cowan as “one of the early civil rights 
organizers in the South in the 1960s”). 
 24. Cowan joined academia as a professor of communications and media law 
and went on to become the Dean of the University of Southern California 
Annenberg School of Communication. Geoffrey Cowan, U. OF S. CAL., 
https://gould.usc.edu/faculty/?id=207 (last updated Jan. 3, 2019) (last visited 
Sept. 11, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 25. See March 6, 1968 Letter from Quentin D. Young, supra note 22 (“For 
my part, I would like to see my company stop producing this inhuman material.”). 
At the time he sent the first letter to Dow, Young was Medical Committee’s 
National Chairman. Documents in Medical Committee’s archive establish that 
Young continued to play the lead role in Medical Committee’s activism at Dow 
even after he stepped down from this position. 
 26. See Letter from Quentin D. Young, National Chairman, Medical 
Committee for Human Rights, to Secretary, Dow Chemical Company (March 11, 
1968) (on file with author & Univ. of Penn. Archives, Coll. 641, Folder 421) 
(showing that Geoffrey Cowan was bcc’d on the letter). At oral argument before 
the Supreme Court, Erwin Griswold stated that Medical Committee’s first 
proposal to Dow was submitted “[e]ven before the shares were registered in its 
name.” Oral argument at 03:46, SEC v. Med. Comm. For Human Rights, 404 U.S. 
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Dow, best known for producing Saran Wrap, had won a 
contract to manufacture napalm for the U.S. Air Force.27 By the 
spring of 1966, Dow was manufacturing napalm at its Torrance, 
California factory.28 From the beginning, its production of napalm 
was controversial; protests against Dow’s manufacture of napalm 
began on the West Coast in March 1966.29 Dow’s executives 
expected picketing at their May 1966 annual meeting, but none 
occurred.30 Although some other companies also briefly produced 
napalm for the government, by 1968, Dow was its only American 
manufacturer.31 
                                                                                                     
403 (1972), No. 70-61, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-61. 
 27. E.N. BRANDT, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD 94 (2003). According to Robert M. 
Neer, five companies submitted bids, and Dow, Witco, and United Technology 
Center, a subsidiary of United Aircraft Corporation, ended up contracting to 
produce napalm. NEER, supra note 6, at 116; see also Lawrence E. Davies, Napalm 
Foes Petition for Vote to Bar Factory in Coast City, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1966, at 
8. 
 28. Davies, supra note 27, at 8. A Dow public relations manager told the New 
York Times that Dow had “two small contracts” with the Air Force to manufacture 
roughly 25 million pounds of napalm, worth around $3.5 million. Douglas 
Robinson, Dow Chemical Office Picketed for Its Manufacture of Napalm, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 29, 1966, at 2. Robert M. Neer reported that Dow’s actual production 
was much greater: 54,620 tons in 1966 (more than 109 million pounds) and over 
22,000 tons in the first six months of 1967. NEER, supra note 6, at 136. 
 29. See BRANDT, supra note 27, at 95.  
 30. Weeks later, however, Dow’s headquarters in Manhattan were picketed 
by protestors carrying signs that said “Napalm Burns Babies, Dow Makes 
Money.” Robinson, supra note 28, at 2. Another napalm manufacturer, Witco 
Chemical Company, did experience picketing at its 1966 annual shareholders 
meeting. Witco Meeting Told Profit Is Up; Pickets Score Napalm Output, WALL ST. 
J., Apr. 28, 1966, at 2. When asked how much napalm Witco produced, its chair, 
William Wishnick, told the Wall Street Journal, “‘I hate to tell you how little,’ 
adding later that it represented less than one-tenth of 1% of last year’s sales, 
which would mean less than $146,000.” Id. The Wall Street Journal also reported 
that Wishnick said, “‘[i]t is the definite policy of the company to cooperate with 
the Government and to manufacture quality products for the Government. We 
also feel it is the duty of every patriotic American to do so.’” Id. E.N. Brandt wrote 
that “Gerstacker drew up a position statement on napalm that he put in his 
pocket in case he needed it” at the 1966 shareholder meeting. BRANDT, supra note 
27, at 94. Although Gerstacker did not need to use it at the annual meeting that 
year, “he and the company were to use [it] extensively over the succeeding years.” 
Id. 
 31. Kenneth C. Field, Dow Chemical Meeting Backs Production of Napalm; 
Antiwar Protestors Rebuffed, WALL ST. J., May 9, 1968, at 4; Protest Due at Dow 
Meeting, WASH. POST, May 4, 1968, at D10; see also ARCHIE B. CARROLL, KENNETH 
J. LIPARTITO, JAMES E. POST, & PATRICIA H. WERHANE, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: 
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 232 (2012) (“In spite of its efforts to help the military 
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At the time, Dow had seventeen directors.32 With the 
exception of Melvin Calvin, who had won the 1961 Nobel Prize in 
chemistry, all of Dow’s directors were executives of the company in 
one capacity or another. One was a Canadian citizen,33 at least two 
were veterans of World War II,34 and nearly all of them were 
scientists.35 A few months before the company’s 1967 shareholder 
meeting, Dow’s board met for two days to take up the napalm issue, 
and ultimately voted, possibly unanimously, to continue 
production despite the reputational risks.36 At least one Dow board 
member, Herbert Doan, had moral qualms about the company’s 
napalm production.37 For one of Dow’s oldest board members, Earl 
W. Bennett, Dow’s production of napalm might have offered a 
personal, patriotic redemption. In the early 1940s, the U.S. Justice 
Department had prosecuted Bennett, along with Dow Chemical 
Company and its then-president, Willard H. Dow, for their role in 
a conspiracy to restrict production of magnesium, which 
undermined the American defense in World War II.38 This time, 
                                                                                                     
in its battles, Dow became public enemy number one, and its linkage with the war 
did little to enhance the business community’s reputation during this time.”); 
Anthony Ripley, Napalm Assailed at Dow Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1969, at 
12 (noting that, in 1969, Dow was the only company then manufacturing napalm). 
 32. See THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, PROXY STATEMENT FOR ANNUAL 
MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS TO BE HELD MAY 8, 1968 (Mar. 22, 1968). The directors 
were: Dow’s President, Herbert D. Doan; Chair of the Board, Carl A. Gerstacker; 
Donald K. Ballman; Earle B. Barnes; Earl W. Bennett; Robert B. Bennett; A. P. 
Beutel; C. B. Branch; Melvin Calvin; William R. Dixon; Leland I. Doan; Herbert 
H. Dow; John M. Henske; Julius E. Johnson; Max Key; Zoltan Merszei; and 
Macauley Whiting.  
 33. See id. (indicating that Merszei was a Canadian citizen). 
 34. See id. at 3–6 (stating that Gerstacker and Bennet were WWII veterans).  
 35. See id. (stating that Ballman, Barnes, Beutel, Branch, Calvin, Doan, 
Dow, Gerstacker, Henske, Johnson, Key, and Whiting had degrees in chemistry 
or engineering). 
 36. See BRANDT, supra note 27, at 96–97 (stating that Dow’s former 
president, Ted Doan, recalled “maybe one” vote “at most” against Dow’s continued 
manufacture of napalm). 
 37. See Allan Sloan, Advice from Dow Chemical: Always a Borrower Be, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 25, 1976, at 107 (“Herbert Doan, a member of the Dow family who 
had been president, was known to be troubled by the moral issue of napalm.”).  
 38. See Firms, Officers Indicted, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 1941, at 2. Bennett and 
Dow pleaded nolo contendere and paid thousands of dollars in fines in a case that 
cast Dow and its executives as profit-hungry and disloyal to American interests. 
See Magnesium Field Opened by Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1942, at 23 (detailing 
the settlement); see also Mark R. Wilson, Making ‘Goop’ Out of Lemons: The 
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Dow was a target for public condemnation because it was acting to 
support, rather than undermine, American military action. 
Young’s 1968 letter to Dow acknowledged that Medical 
Committee’s proposal was “technically late” under the SEC’s rules, 
but requested that Dow include a resolution in its proxy 
statement39 on “a matter of such great urgency that we think it is 
imperative not to delay until the shareholders’ meeting next 
year.”40 The text of the proposed resolution asked Dow’s board to 
amend its certificate of incorporation to prohibit Dow from selling 
napalm “to any buyer unless that buyer gives reasonable 
assurance that the substance will not be used on or against human 
beings.”41 The letter explained that the Medical Committee was 
“primarily” concerned about human life, but also discussed two 
specific financial considerations for the company: that Dow’s 
                                                                                                     
Permanente Metals Corporation, Magnesium Incendiary Bombs, and the Struggle 
for Profits During World War II, 12 ENTERPRISE & SOC. 10,  
14 –18 (2011) (describing Dow’s role); Lewis Corey, Problems of the Peace: I. War 
Plants, 3 ANTIOCH REV. 438, 442 (1943) (describing a “plot of Alcoa and Dow 
Chemical Company to limit American production of magnesium, while output 
zoomed in Germany”). 
 39. A “proxy statement” is a lengthy publication transmitted to corporate 
shareholders and filed with the SEC in advance of a public company’s annual 
shareholder meeting. See, e.g., Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 
323, 334 (3d Cir. 2015) (the proxy statement “is an informational package that 
tells shareholders ‘about items or initiatives on which [they] are asked to vote, 
such as proposed bylaw amendments, compensation or pension plans, or the 
issuance of new securities’” (quoting Apache Corp. v. Chevedden, 696 F. Supp. 2d 
723, 727 (S.D. Tex. 2010))). The purpose of the proxy statement is to provide 
shareholders with information about matters that will appear on the ballot at the 
shareholder meeting. Id. 
 40. Under a subsection of Rule 14a-8, Medical Committee was required to 
submit its proposal to Dow’s management at least sixty days before the date 
corresponding to the date upon which Dow had filed its proxy statement the 
preceding year. See Rule 14a-8(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a) (1969). Because it 
missed this deadline, Medical Committee’s proposal was excludable. 
 41. Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 662 (D.C. Cir. 
1970), vacated 404 U.S. 403 (1972). The full text read:  
RESOLVED, that the shareholders of the Dow Chemical Company 
request the Board of Directors, in accordance with the laws of the State 
of Delaware, and the Composite Certificate of Incorporation of the Dow 
Chemical Company, to adopt a resolution setting forth an amendment 
to the Composite Certificate of Incorporation of the Dow Chemical 
Company that napalm shall not be sold to any buyer unless that buyer 
gives reasonable assurance that the substance will not be used on or 
against human beings. 
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production of napalm had made recruitment of new employees 
difficult, and that “public reaction” to Dow’s role in the Vietnam 
War had an “adverse impact on our global business.”42 
Both considerations were valid and should have concerned the 
company’s shareholders. From 1966 to 1970, Dow experienced 
more than two hundred protests, most occurring at universities 
when Dow recruiters visited the campus.43 A significant riot broke 
out at the University of Wisconsin’s Madison campus in October 
1967, marking the first time that tear gas was used on an 
American university campus.44 Soon afterward, Dow began 
publishing an internal newsletter, the “Napalm News,” to inform 
company executives about protests and Dow’s precautions in 
response.45 In February 1968, a timed bomb exploded at Dow’s 
Frankfurt office, and another bomb exploded at Dow’s Milan office 
in April.46 Both attacks caused little damage but underscored the 
escalating public hostility toward the company.47 
Dow’s general counsel, William A. Groening, Jr., wrote back to 
Medical Committee at the end of March to confirm that its letter 
had arrived too late—Dow’s proxy statement had already been 
                                                                                                     
 42. See id. (quoting the letter). 
 43. BRANDT, supra note 27, at 96; Dow Offices Vandalized, CHEMICAL & 
ENGINEERING NEWS, Nov. 17, 1969, at 15; Napalm and the Dow Chemical 
Company, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/two-
days-in-october-dow-chemical-and-use-napalm/ (last visited June 13, 2019) (“Dow 
recruiters found themselves trapped in interview rooms, spat on, forced to hustle 
out of back exits, and called ‘baby killers.’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 44. See C. Gerald Fraser, Antiwar Protest Ends in Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
19, 1967), at 8 (describing “two days of protests directed at on-campus recruiting 
by the Dow Chemical Company” that ended in 65 injured persons and nine 
student arrests); NEER, supra note 6, at 135 (noting that the riot “triggered almost 
2,000 newspaper articles and editorials about Dow and napalm: almost double 
the total number of articles about the firm and its controversial product published 
to that date”). 
 45. BRANDT, supra note 27, at 98. 
 46. Violence Mounts in West Germany, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1968, at 23; Bomb 
Shatters Dow Napalm Site, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 1, 1968, at A-4. 
 47. Violence Mounts in West Germany, supra note 46, at 23. There were also 
reports that Dow’s stock price suffered as a result of the napalm controversy. For 
example, in April 1968, one commentator noted that President Johnson’s first 
“peace overtures” had caused Dow’s stock price to reach “new highs” on the 
prospect of “seeing its contested business in napalm manufacture disappear.” 
John Chamberlain, The Doves on Wall Street, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 
25, 1968, at A-12. 
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printed—and to promise to study the matter and get back to 
them.48 Medical Committee did not hear back.49 The months that 
followed were incredibly busy for the civil rights organization. 
After the April 4 assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., Medical 
Committee personnel treated injured persons in riots around the 
country.50 In June, Medical Committee members temporarily shut 
down a meeting of the House of Delegates of the American Medical 
Association to protest racism within the medical community’s most 
prestigious organization.51 In August, Medical Committee 
personnel gave assistance to civilians tear gassed in Chicago 
protests, while fifty Medical Committee members protested 
Maryland Governor Spiro T. Agnew’s nomination for the vice 
presidency, citing his cutbacks to the state’s Medicaid program.52 
B. Dow’s 1968 Shareholder Meeting 
Although Dow had refused Medical Committee’s late proposal, 
its 1968 shareholder meeting became a focal point of anti-war 
protest.53 In anticipation of demonstrations, Dow announced 
                                                                                                     
 48. Dow’s 1968 proxy statement was dated March 22, 1968. See THE DOW 
CHEMICAL COMPANY, NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS TO BE HELD 
MAY 8, 1968 (Mar. 22, 1968) (on file with author).  
 49. Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 662 (D.C. Cir. 
1970), vacated 404 U.S. 403 (1972). Groening remained Dow’s legal 
representative throughout its dispute with Medical Committee. He was appointed 
Dow’s assistant general counsel in February 1951. Business Notes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 25, 1951, at 122. In 1981, Groening published THE MODERN CORPORATE 
MANAGER: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION (1981). 
 50. See YOUNG, supra note 17, at 78 (“Ten police precincts appealed to us for 
help in treating prisoners, and forty of our doctors responded. On the street, one 
of our doctors saved the life of a soldier who’d had a heart attack during the 
riots.”). 
 51. See Victor Cohn, AMA Meeting Disrupted by Protest Group, WASH. POST, 
June 17, 1968, at A3 (describing how the AMA first cut off the microphones and 
then played music over statements made by Medical Committee members to 
protest the AMA’s role in “denying health care to millions of the poor and the 
black”). 
 52.  Douglas E. Kneelands, Agnew Cheered and Booed on Return to 
Maryland, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1968, at 31; Protesters Hurt in Chicago Get Care 
From Volunteer Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1968, at 23. 
 53. A group of clergy had also asked the company for a shareholder vote on 
napalm at its 1968 meeting, though it is not clear that the clergy were 
stockholders. Clergy Urge Dow Stockholder Vote on Napalm, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 
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beforehand that it would restrict admittance to the meeting.54 
Hundreds of activists converged on Midland, Michigan on May 8, 
1968 for the meeting.55 While the company’s 1967 meeting was 
attended by 300 shareholders, its 1968 meeting had nearly 1,200 
in attendance.56 The “March on Midland” was led, not by Medical 
Committee, but by the Reverend Richard R. Fernandez of Clergy 
and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, an anti-war group.57 
Dow’s president, Ted Doan, and its Board Chair, Carl A. 
Gerstacker, met with Fernandez and four other anti-war activists 
across the street from the middle school where Dow’s annual 
meeting took place, inside a church, before a large audience.58 
Gerstacker told the activists that he personally wanted the war to 
come to an end. “Companies don’t start wars, and companies can’t 
end them,” he told the assembled group.59 
Outside the shareholder meeting, “the lawn in front of the 
school had become a kind of slogan-chanting carnival, with 
discussion groups, amateur musical soloists and groups of various 
kinds, antiwar posters and picket signs.”60 Twenty-seven 
                                                                                                     
1968, at 3. Dow’s 1968 shareholder meeting took place at the end of the 1967–68 
school year, which saw by far more college protests than any subsequent year. See 
Jerry M. Flint, Napalm Bid Lost, Dow Still Target, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1969, at 
38 (noting that Dow experienced 133 campus demonstrations in  
1967–68; 29 in 1968–69; and four in the fall of 1969). 
 54. See Dow To Restrict Annual Meeting, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, May 8, 
1968, at A-11 (noting that admittance was restricted to employees and 
stockholders with identification). 
 55. See Field, supra note 31, at 4 (noting “[a]bout 300 college students and 
clergymen wearing black arm bands” picketed the meeting). 
 56. Id; see also Napalm Protest Planned, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1968, at 95 
(reporting that protest leaders “expected about 50 people representing some 500 
proxies to attend” Dow’s annual meeting). 
 57. BRANDT, supra note 27, at 99. A year earlier, Clergy and Laymen 
Concerned About Vietnam had organized a protest of the Eastman Kodak Co. 
shareholder meeting to challenge the company’s employment practices with 
regard to race. See infra notes 228–230 and accompanying text; Protest Due at 
Dow Meeting, supra note 31 (describing actions a year earlier); Robert A. Wright, 
Annual Meetings Calm Down, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, May 11, 1969, at D-16 
(“In 1967, Eastman Kodak Co.’s annual meeting was a focal point in the Negro 
civil-rights battle.”). 
 58. BRANDT, supra note 27, at 99. According to the Washington Post, the 
activists were “two clergymen, a stockbroker, a housewife and a nun.” Dow 
Defends Napalm as GI Saver, WASH. POST, May 9, 1968, at E20. 
 59. Field, supra note 31, at 4. 
 60. BRANDT, supra note 27, at 99–100. Although Brandt, Gerstacker’s 
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protestors gained admission to the meeting with stockholders’ 
proxies.61 Some spoke at the meeting; Gerstacker later claimed 
that his “main problem” was “to try to restrain the employees and 
local people who wanted to throw these people out physically.”62 
One Dow shareholder—a broker who had traveled from Scarsdale, 
New York—nominated an anti-war board candidate from the floor 
of the meeting, but the nominee was defeated in the vote.63 
C. Medical Committee’s 1969 Proposal 
The next year, Medical Committee again submitted a napalm 
proposal to Dow, and this time it complied with the deadline under 
Rule 14a-8.64 Around the same time, the Union Theological 
Seminary divested itself of 6,000 shares of Dow stock to protest the 
                                                                                                     
biographer, claimed that Gerstacker had refused to ask police to help control the 
picketing, some newspaper accounts of the protests described police officers on 
the scene. Id. At the meeting, Gerstacker created a new rule “to control the 
lengthy, never-ending speeches to which the antiwar movement was devoted.” Id. 
The new rule reportedly became known as the “Gerstacker rule” and was used at 
Dow’s annual shareholders meeting at least through the beginning of the 
twenty-first century. Id. Under the rule, “if it takes more than five minutes to ask 
it, it’s not a question but a speech, and if it takes more than five minutes to answer 
it, it’s not an answer but a speech; and either one will be gaveled down.” Id. Dow 
eventually reduced the time from five minutes to three and installed a big clock 
in the room for keeping time. Id. 
 61. See Dow Meeting Is Picketed, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, May 9, 1968, 
at G-4. 
 62. BRANDT, supra note 27, at 100. The Wall Street Journal reported that at 
the conclusion of the meeting, departing stockholders were “serenaded” by 
activists who sang “We Shall Overcome.” Field, supra note 31, at 4.  
 63. Field, supra note 31, at 4. The broker was Daniel J. Bernstein. 
Bernstein’s nominee was Marriner S. Eccles, a war critic, former Chair of the 
Federal Reserve Board and the president of the Utah Mining & Construction Co.; 
Eccles received 1,212 votes. Id. At an earlier meeting with Doan and Gerstacker 
before an audience of activists, Bernstein told the executives he thought Dow 
should “increase its profit margin on napalm to compensate for ‘destroying’ its 
corporate image by continued production.” Dow Defends Napalm as GI Saver, 
supra note 58, at E20. 
 64. The proposal, sent to William Groening, Jr. from Dr. Quentin D. Young, 
noted that Medical Committee was “distressed that 1968 has passed without our 
having received a single word from you on this important matter.” Med. Comm. 
for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated 404 U.S. 
403 (1972). 
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company’s involvement in the Vietnam War.65 Dow responded to 
what was clearly escalating shareholder dissatisfaction by pushing 
back. It asked the SEC for a no-action  
letter—essentially, permission from the regulatory agency to 
exclude the proposal from its proxy statement. Dow claimed the 
proposal was excludable under two subsections of Rule 14a-8: 
Subsection 2, which made a proposal excludable if it was 
“primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, 
racial, religious, social, or similar causes,”66 and Subsection 5, the 
predecessor to the “ordinary business” exception, which made a 
proposal excludable if it recommended or requested action “with 
respect to a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business 
operations of the issuer.”67 
Dow’s response caused Medical Committee to seek out a 
securities lawyer. Cowan, the donor of the Dow shares, 
recommended that Medical Committee consult with Jeffrey 
Bauman, then a lawyer with Arnold & Porter in Washington D.C.68 
Bauman briefly represented Medical Committee in its 
communications with the SEC, before handing the organization off 
to Roberts Owen of Covington & Burling, who would represent it 
                                                                                                     
 65. Dow Stock Is Sold by Union Seminary, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1969, at 31. 
A few months later, the Massachusetts Conference of the United Church of Christ 
made news when it chose to take a $15,000 loss by divesting itself of Dow stock to 
protest Dow’s manufacture of napalm. See Chemical Stock Sold as Protest, 
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, June 11, 1969, at B-19. 
 66. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(2). Subsection 2, about political, racial or social 
causes, had been added in 1952, shortly after a shareholder of the Greyhound bus 
company submitted a proposal seeking to end segregated seating. The Greyhound 
bus company refused to publish it in its proxy, and it was never put to a vote. See 
generally, Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
 67. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(5); Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 432 F.2d at 
680. 
 68.  Letter from Quentin D. Young, Medical Committee for Human Rights, 
to Jeffrey Bauman, Esq., Arnold & Porter (January 21, 1969) (on file with author 
& Univ. of Penn. Archives, Coll. 641, Folder 421) (“Geoff Cowan suggests that you 
would be interested in facilitating a hearing on our behalf before the Securities 
and Exchange Commission . . .”). According to the letter, Cowan had also explored 
with Young the possibility that Medical Committee would spearhead a campaign 
to elect progressive directors to Dow’s board. Id. Medical Committee never 
pursued that plan. Bauman, who had worked for the SEC, went on to become a 
corporate law professor at Georgetown. Jeffrey D. Bauman, GEO. L., 
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/jeffrey-d-bauman/ (last visited Sept. 6, 
2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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through the conclusion of the Supreme Court litigation. On the 
basis of new legal advice, on February 3, Medical Committee 
submitted a “new request” to Dow, essentially changing the text of 
its January 17 proposal.69 The new proposal was carefully couched 
in precatory terms, and now requested merely that Dow’s board 
“consider the advisability” of amending the certificate of 
incorporation to make clear that “the company shall not make 
napalm.”70 
Dow quickly reiterated its objection to this new proposal and, 
on February 18, the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance sided 
with Dow. It issued the requested no-action letter, giving approval 
to Dow’s omission of the proposal from its 1969 proxy statement.71 
Medical Committee responded by requesting that the full 
Commission review the no-action decision of the Division of 
Corporation Finance.72  
On March 23, headlines proclaimed that protestors had 
broken into Dow’s Washington D.C. office and poured “human 
blood” on furniture and equipment.73 The next day, the SEC 
                                                                                                     
  69. Letter from Quentin D. Young, M.D., Member, Executive Committee, 
Medical Committee for Human Rights, to Mr. W. A. Groening, Jr., General 
Counsel, Dow Chemical Company (Feb. 3, 1969) (on file with author & Univ. of 
Penn. Archives, Coll. 641, Folder 421). In addition, on the same day, Medical 
Committee sent a letter to the SEC that requested a staff review of Dow’s decision 
“if it still intended to omit the proposal, and requesting oral argument before the 
Commission if the staff agreed with Dow.” Letter from Quentin D. Young, M.D., 
Member, Executive Committee, Medical Committee for Human Rights, to Mr. 
Donald Lewis, Securities and Exchange Commission (Feb. 3, 1969) (on file with 
author & Univ. of Penn. Archives, Coll. 641, Folder 421); Med. Comm. for Human 
Rights, 432 F.2d at 663. 
 70. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 432 F.2d at 663. 
 71. See id.; Letter from Courtney Whitney, Chief Counsel, Division of 
Corporation Finance, SEC, to Herbert H. Dow, Secretary, The Dow Chemical Co., 
(Feb. 18, 1969) (“For reasons stated in your letter and the accompanying opinion 
of counsel, both dated January 17, 1969, this Division will not recommend any 
action to the Commission if this proposal is omitted from the management’s proxy 
material for the Company’s annual meeting . . . .”). 
 72. Cert. Petition at 4; Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 432 F.2d at 663. This 
was Medical Committee’s second request that the Commission review the 
Division’s no-action determination. 
 73. See Dow Office Invaded, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 23, 1969, at 
A-6 (describing the damage the protestors did to the premises). Although a 
break-in in November 1969 involved a Medical Committee officer, there is no 
indication that the Washington break-in involved Medical Committee members. 
See infra note 88 (discussing other protests). 
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considered Medical Committee’s appeal and affirmed the 
Division’s no-action determination.74 Dow proceeded to print its 
1969 proxy statement, omitting Medical Committee’s napalm 
proposal. 
D. Dow’s 1969 Shareholder Meeting 
On May 7, 1969, Dow’s shareholders again gathered in 
Midland for the annual shareholder meeting. This time, Medical 
Committee sent doctors and medical students from its Detroit 
chapter to picket and to speak at the meeting.75 Among seven 
protesters who gave speeches at the meeting was Theodore Tapper, 
a Medical Committee member and pediatrician who had flown in 
for the meeting from New York.76 Tapper “held aloft” photographs 
of children injured by napalm during his presentation.77 Anti-war 
shareholders again nominated an anti-war candidate to Dow’s 
board.78 Although the anti-war nominee was defeated with only 
4,062 votes, he had won more than three times as many votes as 
the previous year’s anti-war candidate.  The activists’ stockholder 
support was increasing.79 
                                                                                                     
 74. Cert. Petition at 4. The Commission’s decision was “reflected solely in a 
minute of its meeting.” Id. Medical Committee learned of the Commission’s 
decision the same day by telephone. Id. In the litigation that followed, the SEC 
argued that Medical Committee’s appeal was untimely because it was not filed 
within the requisite number of days after the phone call. Id. The D.C. Circuit 
rejected this argument, concluding that the clock did not start to run until the 
SEC mailed Medical Committee notice of the Commission’s decision on April 2. 
See Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 432 F.2d at 663–64 (discussing the details of 
the court’s reasoning on timing). 
 75. See DITTMER, supra note 13, at 176 (describing those in attendance at the 
1969 meeting). 
 76. See Justin Bavarskis, Dow President Vows ‘Patriotism’: Napalm 
Confrontation, WASH. POST, May 9, 1969, at D9 (discussing Trapper’s involvement 
at the meeting). 
 77. Id. Tapper had spent several weeks touring Vietnam in 1967 with the 
Committee of Responsibility where he observed and photographed napalm 
injuries to Vietnamese civilians. Interview with Theodore Tapper, M.D. (June 3, 
2019) [hereinafter “Tapper Interview”].  
 78. See Bavarskis, supra note 76, at D9 (stating that Gen. David Shoup, a 
retired Marine Corp commandant and Vietnam war critic, was nominated to the 
board of directors). 
 79. Id.; see Field, supra note 31, at 4 (reporting that the 1968 board nominee, 
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Dow’s Board Chair, Carl A. Gerstacker, presided over the 
meeting.80 He proclaimed that Dow was producing napalm not for 
profit, but for “patriotism,” and read a letter in which a GI said 
that napalm had saved his platoon from certain death.81 
Gerstacker did not hold back on the protestors, telling them that 
they should feel “ashamed.”82 “You tell untruths about us,” he 
said.83 “And when we confront you with the truth like we did last 
year, you tell new and bigger untruths plus the old ones over and 
over again. And gentlemen, that’s the Goebbels-Hitler technique 
that worked very well in the 30s.”84 Gerstacker’s rhetoric at the 
meeting suggests that conflict between Dow’s management and its 
anti-war shareholders had reached a high pitch, and that Dow’s 
managers were defiant in the face of shareholder opposition. 
After Dow’s 1969 annual meeting, Medical Committee 
engaged a new lawyer, Roberts Owen of Covington & Burling, and 
began a fund-raising drive for its litigation campaign.85 Quentin 
Young, who met with the new law firm as Medical Committee’s 
representative, wrote that Covington & Burling was “interested in 
setting legal precedent to upgrade corporate responsibility.”86 
Protests against Dow continued well into the fall of 1969. In 
November, a group of five people, including a national officer of 
Medical Committee, broke into Dow’s Research Center in Midland 
                                                                                                     
Marriner S. Eccles, received 1,212 votes). 
 80. See Ripley, supra note 31, at 12 (noting Gerstacker attended and spoke 
at the meeting). 
 81. Bavarskis, supra note 76, at D9. 
 82. Ripley, supra note 31, at 12.  
 83 Id.  
 84. Id. Gerstacker’s invocation of Nazism was not random; Dow had been 
dogged for years by allegations that “there was a close historical connection 
between Dow and Nazi chemical producers.” NEER, supra note 6, at 117. These 
allegations reportedly came up at the meeting. See Dow Chemical to Bid On 
Another Contract For Supplying Napalm, supra note 15, at 18 (stating that 
Gerstacker “denied accusations [from shareholders] ranging from alleged Dow 
Chemical cooperation with Nazi scientists to its assertedly making poison gas”). 
 85. Letter from Quentin Young, Med. Comm. for Human Rights, to Roberts 
Owen, Esq., Covington & Burling (May 31, 1969) (on file with author & Univ. of 
Penn. Archives, Coll. 641, Folder 421) (“We hope to raise $3,000 (three thousand 
dollars) from friends of MCHR in support of the necessary litigation.”). 
  86. Letter from Quentin Young, Med. Comm. for Human Rights, to Mr. 
Michael Donnelly (Apr. 8, 1969) (on file with author & Univ. of Penn. Archives, 
Coll. 641, Folder 421). 
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and destroyed documents and computer tapes.87 It was the first 
time that a person affiliated with Medical Committee had broken 
the law in an act against Dow. After trashing Dow’s office, the five 
held a press conference to explain their actions and surrendered to 
police.88  
That same month, Time reported that a group of Notre Dame 
students had “locked up” a Dow recruiter to protest Dow’s 
manufacture of napalm.89 However, Time noted “a special irony to 
the encounter: Dow has quietly stopped producing the sticky 
incendiary jelly.”90 In fact, Dow was promoting the news; its loss of 
the contract was a front-page headline in Midland’s local 
newspaper.91 Major newspapers also reported in November that 
Dow’s contract with the Air Force had expired in May, around the 
time of the annual shareholders meeting, and Dow ran ads to get 
the word out.92 Yet Dow’s management pushed back on the idea 
                                                                                                     
 87. The group of five, which called itself “Beaver 55,” included Jane 
Kennedy, an Assistant Director of Nursing Research and Studies at University of 
Chicago hospitals. Kennedy was a national officer of Medical Committee and a 
member of the executive board of Medical Committee’s Chicago chapter. An audio 
recording of an interview of Kennedy by Studs Terkel can be found at: Jane 
Kennedy Talks About Her Anti-war Activism, Crimes & Experience in Prison, 
Studs Terkel Radio Archive (Nov. 6, 1975), 
https://studsterkel.wfmt.com/programs/jane-kennedy-talks-about-her-anti-war-
activism-crimes-and-experience-prison (last visited July 8, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). For more information on Jane Kennedy, who 
was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1976, see Harriet Gross, Jane 
Kennedy: Making History Through Moral Protest, 2 FRONTIERS: J. WOMEN STUD. 
73 (1977). 
 88. Dow Offices Vandalized, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Nov. 17, 1969, 
at 15. Ultimately, the five members of Beaver 55 pleaded guilty to breaking and 
entering and malicious mischief and received prison sentences. See THE GOOD 
DOCTORS, supra note 13, at 173–74 (discussing the criminal proceedings). 
 89. Dow Drops Napalm, TIME, Nov. 28, 1969; Flint, supra note 53, at 38 
(noting that the Notre Dame group was led by “a mini-skirted nun”). 
 90. Dow Drops Napalm, supra note 89; Flint, supra note 53, at 38 (reporting 
that Dow “has not made napalm for six months”). 
 91. See Flint, supra note 53, at 38 (“Napalm Bid Lost, Dow Still Target”). 
 92. See Dow Drops Napalm, supra note 89 (noting that the contract was 
picked up by American Electric Inc., which sold no consumer products). There was 
another public relations push in May 1971, around the time of the shareholder 
vote on napalm, to emphasize that Dow had stopped manufacturing napalm in 
May 1969. See, e.g., Hugh McCann, Dow Shareholders Reject Napalm Ban, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS, May 6, 1971, at 3; Quarterly Is Boosted to 67 ½ Cents from 
65 Cents; Firm Sees Net Rising in Second Quarter, Year, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1971, 
at 20 (“In 1969, the company was outbid for the government’s napalm supply 
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that it had capitulated. “Making napalm became a matter of 
principle,” Dow’s president, Ted Doan, said.93 He emphasized that 
Dow had simply lost the bid, and planned to bid again on the 
napalm contract in the future.94 
By this time, Medical Committee had already filed a petition 
for review in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, seeking to force Dow to include its napalm proposal in its 
proxy statement. That court would not render a decision until July 
1970, following a particularly tumultuous proxy season. Going into 
the case, it appeared that Medical Committee had little legal basis 
for victory.95 Meanwhile, Medical Committee submitted its napalm 
proposal to Dow for a third year in a row, and Dow again rejected 
it. 
E. The 1970 Proxy Season 
The 1970 proxy season was unique in American business 
history.96 “Proxy season” is the name given to the months between 
March and June each year, when most American public companies 
hold their annual meeting for stockholders. In 1970, an 
unprecedented surge of shareholder activism made headlines as 
the corporate annual meeting became a forum for social and 
political debate and, in some cases, violence.97 
                                                                                                     
contract, and it hasn’t produced the chemical since, the company said.”). 
 93. Flint, supra note 53, at 38. 
 94. Id. (“Dow will bid again on napalm and could produce it again, [Doan] 
added.”). 
 95. See Patrick H. Allen, The Proxy System and the Promotion of Social 
Goals, 26 BUS. LAW. 481, 487 (1970) (stating that, based on prior case law, there 
was “little chance of including in a management proxy statement a shareholder 
proposal which would require that the corporation take either positive or negative 
action to accomplish a result which is deemed socially desirable by the 
shareholder”). 
 96. The Wall Street Journal warned in April that “[a]ctivists protesting the 
Vietnam war, pollution and what they charge is industrial irresponsibility are 
planning to press vigorously their campaigns in the coming weeks at a number of 
shareholder meetings across the country.” Dissent vs. Industry: Activists Intend 
to Use Annual Meetings As Forums for Protests in Coming Weeks, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 7, 1970, at 40. 
 97. The American Society of Corporate Secretaries, anticipating a turbulent 
proxy season in 1970, published a “detailed how-to for maintaining peace” at the 
annual meeting. See id.; see also Robert Metz, Market Place: Will the Meeting 
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 For example, the April stockholders meeting of General 
Electric, picketed by some 300 protestors, was disrupted by a 
“shouting match” on the floor of the meeting, and the meeting was 
ended to diffuse tensions.98 In Connecticut, four proxyholders 
inside the annual meeting of United Aircraft Corp. were arrested 
for disorderly conduct and led outside the “heavily guarded” 
building, which was surrounded by hundreds of anti-war 
picketers.99 In San Francisco, the annual meeting of the Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc., was suspended so that plainclothes 
police officers could clear the building after nine “highly vocal 
members of the Women’s Liberation Front” invaded to protest the 
company’s treatment of women.100 The same month, the Union 
Carbide annual meeting was disrupted by students who burst into 
the hall and had to be “rounded up” by guards.101 One hundred and 
sixty “new-style capitalists” crashed the Commonwealth Edison 
annual meeting, calling themselves the “Committee Against 
Pollution,” and offered an anti-pollution resolution from the 
meeting floor.102 At the May 1970 annual meeting of Olin Corp., 
shareholders were besieged by twenty-eight armed, off-duty police 
                                                                                                     
Come to Order?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1970, at 52 (excerpting the publication). 
 98. See Gene Smith, G.E. Stockholders Hear from Protesters, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 23, 1970, at 66 (reporting that five board candidates were nominated from 
the floor, and proposals from “several young students” with proxies were 
dismissed by GE’s Board Chair because “the majority of share owners,” who were 
not present “had not had an opportunity to study such proposals”); George C. 
Wilson, Student Interrupts GE Stockholders, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1970, at A20 
(reporting that a student leader, one of ten proxy-wielding protestors, was 
interrupted by an “elderly stockholder” who shouted, “Get out, you bum”). 
 99. See Jack Zaiman, Aircraft Meeting Disrupted; 4 Seized, WASH. POST, Apr. 
15, 1970, at A2 (noting that the city of Hartford had refused to give the protestors 
a permit to gather in a park after the meeting, and a federal judge ordered the 
city to allow it). 
 100. See Robert A. Wright, Women Disrupt Meeting of C.B.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
16, 1970, at 63 (reporting that protestors in the meeting were met with “hisses 
from stockholders” but “[l]ater, when the meeting resumed, matters proceeded 
smoothly after [the Chair] announced that ‘we do not dislike women’ and that 10 
percent of CBS employes [sic] were women”). 
 101. See Union Carbide Slapped by 2 Protest Groups—Students and Holders, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1970, at 17 (describing the company’s board chair as “visibly 
shaken by the student disturbance”). 
 102. See Seth S. King, Protests Staged at Utility and Boeing Meetings, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 28, 1970, at 61 (noting that the meeting was adjourned “without any 
formal action on the Committee Against Pollution’s resolution”). 
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officers, fifteen private security guards, and a Doberman Pinscher, 
in anticipation of protests that never 
materialized.103  
 The most dramatic confrontation took place at the April 1970 
annual meeting of Honeywell, Inc. Like Dow, Honeywell, a 
munitions manufacturer, was a target for anti-war protest.104 At 
the meeting, a shareholder confronted the company’s board chair 
by demanding, “How does it feel to be a war criminal?”105 Hundreds 
of protestors showed up to the meeting, and Honeywell’s security 
officers sprayed them with mace; in response, the protestors threw 
rocks.106 Sixty police officers responded, wearing gas masks.107 The 
“[n]early 300 shouting, screaming demonstrators, many stripped 
to the waist and decorated with red and white grease paint,” so 
alarmed the company’s board chair that he ended the meeting after 
only fourteen minutes.108  
The 1970 proxy season also produced Campaign GM, a 
program of shareholder activism at General Motors Corporation. 
Campaign GM was organized by a Washington D.C.-based 
nonprofit, the Project on Corporate Responsibility, which had 
connections to Medical Committee.109 Campaign GM was affiliated 
                                                                                                     
 103. See Olin Musters Force in Case of Protest, But Nothing Happens, WALL 
ST. J., May 1, 1970, at 15 (“Olin’s president, Gordon Grand, apologized to 
stockholders and reporters for what he called ‘management’s overreaction’ to the 
demonstration threat.”); see also Metz, supra note 97, at 52 (stating “[b]efore the 
annual meeting of Hercules, Inc., there was considerable fear that protesters 
might turn up and use some of the explosives manufacturer’s blasting powder to 
reduce the meeting to smithereens,” but “the atmosphere remained calm”).  
 104. See K. Ames Smithers, Honeywell Assailed by War Protestors; Annual 
Meeting Halted After 14 Minutes, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1970, at 8 (discussing the 
protests at Honeywell’s annual meeting in 1970). 
 105. Joel F. Henning, Reforming the Corporations Is Not Enough: Democracy 
for Whom, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1971, at B5 (noting that Honeywell was 
“America’s largest producer of anti-personnel weapons for use in Southeast Asia” 
and that its annual meeting “was adjourned after 13 nervous and noisy minutes 
when the demonstrations inside and outside the meeting were perceived by 
Chairman Binger to be approaching violence”). 
 106. See Smithers, supra note 104, at 8 (explaining the response to 
protestors).  
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Donald E. Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections 
on Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. REV. 419, 423 (1971) (“The Project was formed in 
late 1969 to promote corporate responsibility and to educate management and the 
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with Ralph Nader, the consumer activist, and was organized in 
part by Donald E. Schwartz, a corporate law professor at 
Georgetown Law School.110  
In February 1970, Campaign GM, which owned twelve shares 
of General Motors stock, made a number of demands on the 
company.111 Ultimately General Motors succeeded in excluding 
seven of nine proposals, but the SEC required General Motors to 
include two proposals in its proxy statement.112 One demanded 
that General Motors enlarge its board by adding three new 
directors; Campaign GM announced it would nominate a woman 
director and an African-American director to fill the new 
positions.113 The other proposed the creation of a Shareholders 
Committee for Corporate Responsibility, which would include 
representatives of General Motors’s board, the United Auto 
Workers, and Campaign GM.114 Nader told the Wall Street Journal 
that General Motors’s shareholder meeting would be “a great 
public debate on the giant corporation rather than a wooden recital 
of aggregate financial data.”115 The national news media provided 
                                                                                                     
public about the social role of corporations.”). The connections between the two 
organizations only emerged after Medical Committee had its initial success in the 
D.C. Circuit in July 1970. For example, Roger S. Foster, a former general counsel 
of the SEC and a key figure in Campaign GM, would go on to accompany Medical 
Committee’s Theodore Tapper to Dow’s 1971 shareholder meeting, and the 
Project on Corporate Responsibility would file an amicus brief in support of 
Medical Committee in the Supreme Court. McCann, supra note 92, at 3. Roberts 
Owen, Medical Committee’s lawyer, told the Washington Post that Medical 
Committee’s victory would have an “important impact” on Campaign GM and 
similar activism campaigns. Peter Osnos, Shareholders’ Power Increased by 
Ruling, WASH. POST, July 11, 1970, at E5.  
 110. See, e.g., Morton Mintz, Nader Seeks GM Changes: Would Seat 3 on 
Board, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1970, at A2. 
 111. See Schwartz, supra note 109, at 423 (explaining the demands made by 
Campaign GM in 1970). 
 112.  See id. at 423–24 (describing the two included proposals in depth). 
 113. See id. at 424 (listing proposed new board members as Betty Furness, 
Dr. Rene Dubos, and the Reverend Channing Phillips). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Nader Embarks on Campaign Against GM, Wants Holder Support on 
Safety, Pollution, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1970, at 9. In response, GM’s Board Chair 
told its stockholders that the Project on Corporate Responsibility was “using 
General Motors as a means through which it can challenge the entire system of 
corporate management in the United States.” Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy 
Contest, supra note 109, at 430. This message was included in a twenty-one page 
booklet entitled, “GM’s Record of Progress,” which GM enclosed in the proxy 
CIVIL RIGHTS AND SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 1191 
breathless coverage of Campaign GM’s challenge to General 
Motors’s management in the spring of 1970. In the end, although 
the Campaign GM proposals won only a small percentage of votes, 
they broke new ground by garnering the support of institutional 
investors like the New York City pension funds.116 
Amid the turmoil, Dow’s 1970 shareholder meeting was 
relatively quiet. To more effectively control the meeting, Dow 
moved it to a commercial theater in Midland and required 
stockholders to apply in advance for a ticket to be admitted.117 Only 
one protestor appeared outside the May meeting, which “was taken 
up mostly by a review of the company’s antipollution efforts.”118 No 
one from Medical Committee attended.119 Behind the scenes, 
however, Medical Committee’s legal fight was just getting started.  
                                                                                                     
statement it sent to all of its stockholders. Id. 
 116. See Hobart Rowen, Business Can’t Ignore Protests, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 
1970, at 11 (explaining that in addition to the New York City pension funds, “the 
University of Pennsylvania has announced it will vote all its shares 
pro-consumers”); Schwartz, supra note 109, at 430 (“The proposal for the 
shareholder committee received 6,361,299 votes, representing 2.73 percent of the 
votes cast, from 61,794 shareholders, representing 7.19 percent of the 
shareholders voting. The proposal to amend the bylaws was supported by 
5,691,130 shares, or 2.44 percent of the votes cast, and 53,495, or 6.22 percent of 
the shareholders voting.”)  Although the proposals garnered few votes, General 
Motors chose to voluntarily adopt some of the proposed reforms. See Harwell 
Wells, A Long View of Shareholder Power: From the Antebellum Corporation to 
the Twenty-First Century, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1033, 1084 (2015). 
 117. See THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING OF 
STOCKHOLDERS TO BE HELD MAY 6, 1970 (Mar. 20, 1970) (“[A]dmission to the 
meeting will be by ticket only. For the convenience of stockholders a ticket 
application form is enclosed.”) (on file with author). In previous years, Dow had 
held its annual meeting at a public middle school. See supra notes 58–61 and 
accompanying text (discussing Dow’s previous annual meetings).  
 118. Dow Chemical Sees Recession Lasting Until End of Year, WALL ST. J., 
May 7, 1970, at 8 (“Unlike the last two annual meetings, which were dominated 
by large numbers of antiwar demonstrators protesting Dow’s manufacture of 
napalm, only one picket was in view.”). 
 119. Theodore Tapper, who attended Dow shareholder meetings on Medical 
Committee’s behalf, attended meetings in 1969 and 1971, but not in 1970. Tapper 
Interview, supra note 77. 
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III. Medical Committee in Court 
“It is obvious to the point of banality . . . that Congress 
intended by its enactment of section 14 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 to give true vitality to the concept of 
corporate democracy.”120 
 
Medical Committee’s fight to exercise its rights as a Dow 
shareholder led it to commence litigation on May 29, 1969 that did 
not conclude until the U.S. Supreme Court declared the case moot 
on January 10, 1972.121 The litigation pitted Medical Committee 
solely against the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.122 
Dow never filed an appearance in the case and never submitted a 
brief to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals or to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Nonetheless, Dow played a shadow role in the case, and its 
maneuvering behind the scenes ultimately determined the 
outcome. 
A. A Victory in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
Medical Committee’s lawsuit presented two issues. First, was 
the SEC’s no-action determination judicially reviewable under 
Section 25(a) of the 1934 Act?123 Second, if it was, did the SEC 
violate the 1934 Act when it approved Dow’s decision to exclude 
the napalm proposal?124 The first question was essentially a matter 
of administrative law, while the second cut to the heart of the 
corporate enterprise: did a shareholder have a right to pursue a 
social, environmental, or political reform to corporate policy 
through the procedures of corporate democracy? 
The timing of the case must have worried Medical 
Committee’s lawyers. Coming on the heels of the turbulent 1970 
proxy season, the case seemed to ask the D.C. Circuit to side with 
rock-throwing lawbreakers against a well-respected government 
                                                                                                     
 120. Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 676 (D.C. Cir. 
1970), vacated 404 U.S. 403 (1972). 
 121.  Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 665.  
 124. Id. at 676. 
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agency and the managerial class.125 No doubt the business 
community was hoping that a decision in the SEC’s favor by the 
federal appeals court would tamp down the surge of shareholder 
protests and restore the corporate annual meeting to full 
management control. They were in for a surprise. 
On July 8, 1970, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
unanimously sided with Medical Committee.126 It held that the 
SEC’s no-action letter was judicially reviewable, and sent the 
matter back to the SEC for “more illuminating consideration and 
decision” on the merits—whether Medical Committee’s proposal 
could properly be excluded on the grounds offered.127 But it went 
further, expressing skepticism that the napalm proposal was 
excludable, and articulating an expansive view of corporate 
democracy. The following day, news of the decision ran 
prominently in the business section of the New York Times, which 
proclaimed that the court had decided that “[c]orporate 
                                                                                                     
 125. See supra notes 97–108 and accompanying text (describing protests and 
confrontations). 
 126. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 432 F.2d at 661.  
 127. Id. at 661. Separately, the SEC had argued that Medical Committee’s 
appeal of the Commission’s March 24, 1969 action on May 29—sixty-six days 
later—was not timely. The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument, on the ground 
that the Commission’s decision was not communicated to Medical Committee in 
writing until April 2. See id. at 663–64. The D.C. Circuit’s 1970 decision created 
a spate of law review notes and comments, many of which concluded that the 
court had reached the wrong result on the administrative law issue. See, e.g., 
Note, Liberalizing SEC Rule 14a-8 Through the Use of Advisory Proposals, 80 
YALE L.J. 845, 846 (1971) (arguing that the “difficult line-drawing task” created 
by the ordinary business exclusion could be minimized “by permitting 
shareholders to include in management’s proxy advisory proposals”); Comment, 
Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC: Judicial Review of SEC No-Action 
Determinations Under the Proxy Rules, 57 VA. L. REV. 331, 331 (1971) (“Although 
the immediate impact of Medical Committee will be felt in the field of federal 
corporation law, there are many difficulties with the decision concerning its 
treatment of administrative law questions.”); Note, Proxy Rule 14a-8: Omission 
of Shareholder Proposals, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 700, 721 (1971) (discussing the court’s 
remand of the case). But see Note, The SEC and “No-Action” Decisions Under 
Proxy Rule 14a-8: The Case for Direct Judicial Review, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 835, 837 
(1971) (concluding that direct judicial review of no-action determinations “is both 
proper and necessary”); Comment, Medical Committee for Human Rights v. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 45 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1098, 1110 (1970) 
(forecasting the importance of the case prior to the decision). 
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shareholders have broad rights to participate in corporate 
decisions that have social impact.”128  
The opinion, written by Judge Edward Allen Tamm,129 framed 
the case as presenting “novel and significant questions concerning 
the implementation of the concepts of corporate democracy” 
embodied in federal securities law.130 Observing that, by approving 
the Division’s no-action letter, the Commission had “acted in 
accord with a very dubious legal theory,”131 the court critiqued the 
SEC for “not deign[ing] to address itself to any possible grounds for 
allowing management to exclude this proposal” and confessed 
“puzzlement as to how the Commission reached the result which it 
did.”132 It is “obvious to the point of banality,” the court wrote, that 
when Congress enacted section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act 
                                                                                                     
 128. Eileen Shanahan, U.S. Court Widens Rights of Holders, N.Y. TIMES, July 
10, 1970, at 47. The Wall Street Journal provided no coverage of the decision. In 
a 1970 law review article, Donald Chisum called the case “a pathbreaking 
decision” and asserted that it had “shatter[ed] past assumptions about the 
reviewability of informal SEC action and about the scope of the SEC shareholder 
proposal rule.” Chisum, supra note 7, at 463. Chisum believed the case 
exemplified “[i]nventive judicial craftsmanship.” Id. at 464. 
 129. Judge Tamm was confirmed as a federal judge after eighteen years with 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, where he rose to serve as the “right hand 
man” of J. Edgar Hoover. George E. MacKinnon, Tribute: Edward Allen Tamm, 
74 GEO. L.J. 1576, 1576 (1986). As an FBI official, Tamm supervised the 
Lindbergh kidnapping case and the capture of John Dillinger. Id. Though he was 
a conservative judge, see, e.g., Daniel O. Conkle, A ‘Conservative’ Judge and the 
First Amendment: Judicial Restraint and Freedom of Expression, 74 GEO. L.J. 
1585, 1585 (1986), Judge Tamm appears to have held some socially progressive 
views. See, e.g., id. at 1586 (describing Tamm’s “extremely speech-protective 
stance”); Edward Allen Tamm, Books for Lawyers: Women and the Power to 
Change, 62 A.B.A. J. 174, 180 (1976) (approving review of a book with clear 
feminist themes). Judge Tamm was particularly well-regarded by Chief Justice 
Warren E. Burger; the men shared a passion for efficient judicial administration. 
See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Tribute: Edward Allen Tamm, 74 GEO. L.J. 1571, 
1571 (“In my seventeen year tenure as Chief Justice [of the United States 
Supreme Court], no single judge contributed more to improving our system of 
justice than Edward Tamm.”).  
 130. Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 661 (D.C. Cir. 
1970), vacated 404 U.S. 403 (1972). These words mark the first time the phrase 
“corporate democracy” was used in a decision by a federal court in the D.C. 
Circuit. 
 131. Id. at 674.  
 132. Id. at 676. 
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of 1934, it intended “to give true vitality to the concept of corporate 
democracy.”133  
Judge Tamm wrote: 
No reason has been advanced in the present 
proceedings which leads to the conclusion that 
management may properly place obstacles in the 
path of shareholders who wish to present to their 
co-owners, in accord with applicable state law, the 
question of whether they wish to have their assets 
used in a manner which they believe to be more 
socially responsible but possibly less profitable than 
that which is dictated by present company policy.134 
In other words, all three judges believed that it was within the 
rights of shareholders to vote on whether to pursue socially 
responsible goals at the expense of profitability, and Dow was 
obligated to let the matter go to a vote.135  
                                                                                                     
 133. Id. Over time, he wrote, it had become clear that:  
The question of what constituted a “proper subject” for shareholder 
action was to be resolved by recourse to the law of the state in which 
the company had been incorporated; however, the paucity of applicable 
state law giving content to the concept of “proper subject” led the 
Commission to seek guidance from precedent existing in jurisdictions 
which had a highly developed commercial and corporate law and to 
develop its own “common law” relating to proper subjects for 
shareholder action.  
Id. at 677. The court then recounted the history of the evolution of the exception 
for proposals “primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, 
racial, religious, social or similar causes,” including a history of Peck v. Greyhound 
Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), and pointed out that “the 
Commission’s interpretation or application of this rule has not been considered 
by the courts.” Id. at 678. The court noted that the Commission had “formally 
represented to Congress” that the ordinary business exception was “intended to 
make state law the governing authority in determining what matters are ordinary 
business operations immune from shareholder control,” and that Delaware’s 
corporate law specifically allowed a corporation’s Certificate of Incorporation to 
“change, substitute, enlarge or diminish the nature of [the corporation’s] 
business.” Id.; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 242(a)(2), 242(d) (1968 Cum. Supp.). 
The language remains the same today. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 242(a)(2), 242(d) 
(2019). 
 134. Id. 
 135. A few years after he wrote these words in Med. Comm. for Human Rights 
v. SEC, Tamm wrote another important opinion—a dissent from the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 
821, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Tamm, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
In that dissent, Judge Tamm wrote,  
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The case came down like a thunderclap in the business 
community, where some claimed that it had made a “major 
change” in the law.136 As one put it, “the implications of the 
Medical Committee opinion are far-reaching and indicate that 
many more social questions will be the subject of shareholder 
proposals in the future.”137 A few days after the D.C. Circuit issued 
                                                                                                     
I am inclined to conclude that campaign expenditures, at least, are so 
intertwined with direct political communication to be 
indistinguishable for first amendment purposes; for example, political 
advertising, through the media, bumper stickers, mailings, or 
pamphlets, clearly must be considered ‘pure speech.’ Political 
contributions, also in my mind, are connected with important speech 
and associational interests, although admittedly containing other, less 
constitutionally-valued components. However . . . I need not go beyond 
these conclusions and establish at this time a hierarchy of political 
speech to resolve the issues before us.  
When the Supreme Court overturned the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in its now-iconic 
case, Buckley v. Valeo, it agreed with Judge Tamm: “In sum, although the Act’s 
contribution and expenditure limitations both implicate fundamental First 
Amendment interests, its expenditure ceilings impose significantly more severe 
restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association than do 
its limitations on financial contributions.” 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976); see also George 
E. MacKinnon, Edward Allen Tamm, 74 GEO. L.J. 1576, 1578 (1986) (describing 
Tamm’s “historic dissent” in Buckley v. Valeo). 
 136. See Patrick H. Allen, The Proxy System and the Promotion of Social 
Goals, 26 BUS. LAW. 481, 490 (1970) (explaining the D.C. Circuit’s substantive 
holding “indicate[s] a major change in the nature of the proposals which must be 
included in proxy statements under the shareholder proposal rule”); see also 
Henry G. Manne, Shareholder Social Proposals Viewed by an Opponent, 24 STAN. 
L. REV. 481, 489 (1972) (“[T]he Dow case, as it stands today, has unquestionably 
altered the received doctrine on ‘proper subject . . . .’”); Charles A. Bane, 
Shareholder Proposals on Public Issues, 26 BUS. LAW. 1017, 1021 (1971) (stating 
the D.C. Circuit’s opinion “demonstrates a concern that shareholders be 
permitted to guide the direction that the corporation is going to take on operations 
that involve political or social concerns”). 
 137. Allen, supra note 136, at 495. The management hysteria that greeted the 
D.C. Circuit Court’s decision in Medical Committee, was captured in an article 
published in The Business Lawyer in 1971. It provided advice to corporate 
managers about how to handle a shareholders’ meeting that had gotten out of 
hand, and included this text about shareholders’ “disruptive equipment”: 
Attempts are often made by individuals to bring in their own bull horns 
or loudspeakers. Often there are placards. Attempts sometimes are 
made to carry or to wear equipment for slogan purposes such as gas 
masks (when environmental issues are involved), painted balloons and 
the like. It also is a common practice in these times for dissident groups 
to include a number of mothers or fathers holding infants who, of 
course, are noisy and distracting. 
Bane, supra note 136, at 1026. Mr. Bane advised, “There is no question that the 
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its opinion, Courtney Whitney, Jr., the Chief Counsel of the 
Division of Finance, resigned his position.138  
In the course of just a few months, America’s corporate 
managers had endured the most turbulent proxy season in history 
and an adverse ruling by an important federal appeals court. 
Conservative business leaders were galvanized by these events. A 
few days after the D.C. Circuit’s opinion made news, business 
lawyer Lewis F. Powell, Jr., delivered the keynote address at a 
meeting of Southern business leaders titled “The Attack on 
American Institutions,” in which he argued that the “alleged 
excess profiteering of the military-industrial complex” was a “false 
idea.”139 In defense of companies like Dow and Honeywell, Powell 
quipped to his audience: “If anybody believes they’re profiting, you 
oughta buy some stocks in ‘em.”140 The joke sympathized with 
Dow’s managers, who had long claimed that they were morally 
bound to produce napalm even though it produced little profit. Two 
months after the D.C. Circuit issued its decision, Milton Friedman 
                                                                                                     
physical equipment such as loudspeakers and placards can be excluded on the 
grounds of their disruptive effects on the meeting. It would not seem to be the 
better part of discretion to attempt to exclude the infants.” Id.  
 138. It is not clear whether this was a coincidence, or a consequence of the 
SEC’s loss in Medical Committee, which received a lot of attention from the news 
media and the academy. According to his obituary in the Washington Post, 
Whitney joined the SEC in 1963 and worked his way up to Chief Counsel of the 
Division; from 1971 to 1974 he was a partner in the D.C. firm of Morrison, 
Murphy, Abrahams & Haddock. See Elizabeth Abernethy, Ex-Peace Corps Official, 
Dies, WASH. POST, July 7, 1987 (discussing the life of Courtney Whitney, Jr.). 
Thus, he seems to have had a gap in his employment following his departure from 
the SEC. Id.  
 139. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., The Attack on American Institutions, Address at 
the Southern Industrial Relations Conference (July 15, 1970). About a year later, 
in 1971, Powell produced what has become known as the “Powell Memorandum,” 
which developed many of the themes he discussed in his July 1970 address. See 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., “The Memo” (1971). Powell Memorandum: Attack On 
American Free Enterprise System, at 
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/powellmemo/1. Powell was nominated to 
the Supreme Court by President Nixon in December, 1971, while SEC v. Medical 
Committee for Human Rights was pending before the high court. Powell played 
no role in the case.  
 140. Powell’s comment about the companies’ profitability is not in the text of 
his speech, but can be heard in the audio recording of the address at  
18:28–18:36. The recording, which can be found in the Powell Archives at Washington 
and Lee University School of Law, is available at 
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/powellspeeches/8/. 
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published his famous essay in the New York Times Magazine, “The 
Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits,” in 
which he argued that supporters of corporate social responsibility 
were “preaching pure and unadulterated socialism.”141  
B. A Loss in the U.S. Supreme Court 
When the Supreme Court agreed to take up SEC v. Medical 
Committee for Human Rights in March 1971, the case “had been 
expected to result in an important decision concerning the flood of 
anti-war, environmental and other proxy-vote proposals that are 
being submitted to corporate managements.”142 Yet this would not 
come to pass. The SEC, which had petitioned for certiorari and 
filed a brief on the merits in July, did a full reversal in November, 
on the eve of oral argument. Suddenly, the SEC argued that the 
case had become moot and, ultimately, the Supreme Court agreed. 
After the Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari in 
March, but before it heard oral argument in November, Dow held 
its 1971 shareholder meeting.143 This was the company’s first 
                                                                                                     
 141. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970. 
 142. High Court to Decide if FCC Can Make Big CATV Systems Originate 
Programs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 1972, at 4; see also John P. MacKenzie, Agonizing 
Term: Seven-Member Court Convenes Monday, Faces Tough Issues, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 3, 1971 at A1, A17. MacKenzie described the “tough issues” facing the 
Supreme Court in the October 1971 term and specifically highlighted the Medical 
Committee case: 
Reformers seeking to make the federal regulatory agencies work for 
them are locked in a battle with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. The SEC contends that it needn’t explain or defend its 
failure to require corporations to put so-called “social issues” on the 
ballots of stockholders’ proxy statements. An angry Court of Appeals 
here suggested that the Dow Chemical Co., which refused to put the 
manufacture of napalm to a stockholder vote, was promoting its own 
management view of the social issue. 
 143. According to a typewritten note stapled to the papers of Justice William 
O. Douglas, the SEC’s cert petition was supported by Justices Blackmun, White, 
Harlan, and Burger. Typed Note, No. 70-61 (undated), in THE PAPERS OF WILLIAM 
O. DOUGLAS IN THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (1971) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  Justice Douglas did not participate in the decision to grant 
cert; a note from his clerk, RLJ, states that this was “because Covington was 
counsel for resp.” RLJ, Memorandum (November 10, 1971), in THE PAPERS OF 
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS IN THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, (1971) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  The original filing date for the SEC’s merits 
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annual meeting since the decision of the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals, and Dow put Medical Committee’s napalm proposal in its 
proxy statement and on the ballot. Journalists reported that “no 
demonstrations” against napalm occurred at the meeting, and that 
a smaller number of stockholders attended than in previous 
years.144 On the day before the meeting, Dow’s stock price hit a 
new high for 1971 after management increased the quarterly 
dividend, which it declared a month early.145 It is possible that 
Dow’s management issued an early, especially large dividend to 
stockholders right before the meeting to help secure their support 
in the controversial and unprecedented napalm vote. 
In its proxy statement, in response to Medical Committee’s 
proposal, Dow asserted that it had not produced napalm since May 
1969.146 Nonetheless, Dow argued that its shareholders should 
reject the proposal, offering two reasons. One was a moral reason: 
“[S]o long as American soldiers are serving in armed conflict,” Dow 
wrote, the company had “a moral obligation to provide the support 
the United States Government asks.”147 The other was the 
proposal’s “doubtful validity.”148 Its validity was in question, Dow 
contended, because § 122(12) of the Delaware Corporation Law 
granted corporations the specific authority to transact “any lawful 
business which the corporation’s board of directors shall find to be 
in aid of governmental authority.”149 Moreover, Dow argued the 
proposal “may be contrary to” federal law: the Defense Production 
                                                                                                     
brief was, by some coincidence, scheduled for the same date as Dow’s May 5, 1971 
annual shareholder’s meeting. See Supreme Court Docket, SEC v. Med. Comm. 
for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403 (1972) (No. 1162) (listing the multiple deadlines 
for the SEC’s merit brief) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
Ultimately, the SEC received four extensions to its time to file its merits brief. Id.  
 144. See Gerd Wilcke, Dow Chemical Announces a 3-for-2 Split of Its Stock, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1971, at 63 (noting that 900 stockholders attended). 
 145. See New 1971 Highs & Lows On N.Y. Stock Exchange: Wednesday, May 
5, 1971, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1971, at 31; Quarterly Is Boosted to 67 ½ Cents from 
65 Cents; Firm Sees Net Rising in Second Quarter, Year, supra note 92, at 20 
(“Carl A. Gerstacker, chairman, said the dividend was declared a month earlier 
than usual ‘to avoid any speculation on what dividends might be on the new 
stock.’”). 
 146. See THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, PROXY STATEMENT FOR ANNUAL 
MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS TO BE HELD MAY 5, 1971 10 (1971). 
 147. Id. at 10. 
 148. Id.  
 149. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(12) (2019). 
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Act of 1950.150 Both of these arguments were strained; the 
precatory proposal did not constrain Dow’s board in any way that 
would have put the company in violation of either law. Dow did not 
argue that Medical Committee’s proposal encroached on 
management’s authority to manage the company, nor that the 
outcome Medical Committee sought—that Dow’s board “consider 
the advisability of” amending Dow’s certificate of incorporation to 
prohibit the production of napalm—would have harmed the 
company or its shareholders in any way.151 
Theodore Tapper, the pediatrician, presented the napalm 
proposal on Medical Committee’s behalf at the meeting.152 In his 
remarks, Tapper argued that “[s]hareholders are as fully 
knowledgeable as management on the moral questions raised by 
napalm and should now vote resoundingly against resuming 
napalm production.”153 Tapper was joined by Roger S. Foster, a 
former general counsel of the SEC, in his criticism of Dow; the two 
also raised concerns about pollution at the company’s Freeport, 
Texas factory and about the health risks of Dow’s 2-4-5T 
herbicide.154 Another stockholder activist spoke at the meeting to 
criticize Dow’s plan to bring an atomic power plant to Midland.155 
Medical Committee’s proposal was soundly defeated at the 
ballot, garnering so few votes that, under the SEC’s rules, it could 
                                                                                                     
 150. See generally, The Defense Production Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-774, 
64 Stat. 798 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 4501 et seq.). The procedures of 
the Defense Production Act were not invoked for napalm production, so it is 
difficult to see how Medical Committee’s proposal could have been “contrary” to 
the law. Dow’s argument here was a stretch. 
 151. THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, PROXY STATEMENT FOR ANNUAL MEETING 
OF STOCKHOLDERS TO BE HELD MAY 5, 1971 10 (1971). 
 152. Tapper had responded to a request from Medical Committee’s national 
organization for a volunteer to present the proposal; he flew to Detroit, where he 
was picked up by a medical student and driven to Midland for the meeting. 
Tapper Interview, supra note 77. Tapper recalled that he prepared his own 
remarks to present the proposal, without assistance from the national 
organization. Id. 
 153. Hugh McCann, Dow Shareholders Reject Napalm Ban, DETROIT FREE 
PRESS, May 6, 1971, at 3.  
 154. Id. Foster, a 70-year-old former general counsel for the SEC, would go on 
to file an amicus brief on behalf of the Project on Corporate Responsibility in the 
Supreme Court case. 
 155. Id. (noting that the stockholder, from St. Paul Minnesota, was identified 
as Stephen Gedler). 
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not be submitted again for three years. It would turn out to be a 
consequential vote. 
Meanwhile, the SEC was working behind the scenes to change 
the shareholder proposal rules. In October 1971, shortly before the 
Supreme Court heard oral argument in SEC v. Medical Committee 
for Human Rights, the Chair of the SEC, William Casey, expressed 
skepticism about the corporate social responsibility movement and 
emphasized the SEC’s role in “maintaining the cost and 
effectiveness of the procedures of corporate democracy” and “the 
need to keep operational authority and responsibility firmly on 
management.”156 Casey concluded that when “social goals have 
overriding public value,” they should be pursued through 
“legislative or budgetary action.”157 The implication was that they 
should not be pursued through corporate governance mechanisms. 
Before the end of the year, the SEC would propose to amend one of 
the Rule 14a-8 exclusions that Dow had relied upon, Section 2, 
concerning proposals on “general economic, political, racial, 
religious, social or similar causes.”158 The refashioned Rule, which 
went into effect before the 1973 proxy season, removed such topics 
as grounds for exclusion, but added as a new ground for exclusion 
that a proposal “is not significantly related to the business of the 
issuer.”159 Since Dow’s production of napalm was a minor part of 
                                                                                                     
 156. Corporate Responsibility Seen From the SEC, An Address by William J. 
Casey, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, Securities and 
Exchange Commission News, October 21, 1971, 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1971/102171casey.pdf (reproducing a speech 
given at the American Bar Association National Institute). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Notice of Proposed Amendments to Rule 14-a5 and 14a-8 of the 
Commission’s Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 9432, 1971 SEC LEXIS 252 
(Dec. 22, 1971).  
 159. See Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 
9,784, 1972 SEC LEXIS 155 (Sept. 22, 1972), 37 Fed. Reg. 23,178 (1972). Under 
the revision, management could omit a proposal if it “consists of a 
recommendation, request or mandate that action be taken with respect to any 
matter, including a general economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar 
cause, that is not significantly related to the business of the issuer or is not within 
the control of the issuer.” Id. This was a change from the exclusion that was 
applied to Medical Committee’s proposal by the SEC, which made a proposal 
excludable if it “clearly appears that the proposal is submitted by the security 
holder primarily for the purpose of enforcing a personal claim or redressing a 
personal grievance against the issuer or its management, or primarily for the 
purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or 
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its business,160 the change likely would have foreclosed the Dow 
napalm proposal in future years, and it provided additional 
leverage to companies to exclude social proposals.161 
The Supreme Court case moved slowly ahead, during a period 
of transition for the high court. When the Supreme Court had 
granted the SEC a writ of certiorari in March 1971, Justices Hugo 
Black and John Marshall Harlan had filled two of the nine 
positions on the Court. Before the case was heard, however, both 
would experience health crises and resign. Black’s resignation was 
a blow to Medical Committee because he was a reliable vote in 
favor of civil rights and against corporate rights, and quite possibly 
would have voted to support Medical Committee’s arguments in 
the case.162 Harlan had voted to grant a writ of certiorari in the 
                                                                                                     
similar causes.” Id. 
 160. See, e.g., Robert J. Samuelson, Dow Chemical Company: Sales and 
Worries Are Up, 158 SCI. 1031, 1032 (Nov. 24, 1967) (“Dow has constantly stressed 
the smallness of the napalm contract—less than ½ of 1 percent of total earnings.”). 
 161. Although the wording of the amendment made the clause “not 
significantly related to the business of the issuer” applicable to any kind of 
proposal, not merely social and political proposals, the SEC made clear in its 
adopting release that the change would not foreclose “traditional shareholder 
proposals dealing with stockholder relationships with the management.” 
Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 9,784, 1972 
SEC LEXIS 155 (Sept. 22, 1972). Other changes in the 1972 amendments were 
designed to make it more difficult for shareholders to successfully submit 
proposals seeking social reforms. For example, the 1972 amendments increased 
the word limit on shareholders’ supporting statements from 100 to 200 words, but 
clarified that any “whereas” preamble to the resolution itself would be included 
within the word limit. Id. “The purpose of the change is to curtail the growing 
tendency of security holders to evade the word limitation on supporting 
statements by submitting lengthy proposals which contain supporting 
argumentation within the text of the proposals themselves,” the SEC explained. 
Id. The 1972 amendments also moved up the deadline for shareholders to submit 
proposals (to 70 days prior to the corresponding date for the previous year’s 
annual meeting, from 60 days), and hinted that the SEC might go after 
shareholders who submitted proposals but failed to turn up at the meeting to 
present them. See id. 
 162. For a discussion of Justice Black’s voting record in favor of civil rights 
and in opposition to corporate rights, see ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: 
HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS 265–72 (2018); see also Stern 
v. S. Chester Tube Co., 390 U.S. 606 (1968) (Black, J., unanimous opinion) 
(ordering the South Chester Tube Company to permit a minority stockholder to 
inspect its books and records pursuant to Pennsylvania corporate law). 
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case.163 When the case was finally argued in November, both men’s 
chairs sat empty. 
In a significant reversal, in a reply brief filed just days before 
oral argument, the SEC changed its position in the case: it now 
argued that the case was moot because Medical Committee’s 
napalm proposal had been submitted for a shareholder vote in 
1971 and had lost.164 Moreover, at oral argument, Solicitor General 
Erwin Griswold emphasized that Dow had ceased to manufacture 
napalm for the U.S. government and had no plans to resume 
production.165 For these reasons, the SEC now urged the Court not 
to decide the case. 
Roberts Owen, a prominent lawyer and a partner at Covington 
& Burling, argued the case on behalf of Medical Committee, and 
was essentially blindsided by the SEC’s new position, which 
Medical Committee had had no time to address on the papers.166 
At oral argument, Chief Justice Burger specifically asked Owen to 
address the mootness issue “in the light of the action on the proxy 
statement doing just what you wanted and in light of the fact that 
they have stopped manufacturing Napalm.”167 Owen pushed back: 
Dow “immediately announced that they wanted to get that 
contract back again and resume supplying napalm to the 
government so that as far as that fact is concerned, I think [the 
mootness argument] is simply besides the point.”168 
                                                                                                     
 163. Typed Note, No. 70-61 (undated), in THE PAPERS OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 
IN THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (1971) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 164. See Brief of Petitioner at 1–8, SEC v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 
404 U.S. 403 (1972) (No. 70-61) (arguing mootness). 
 165. Oral Argument at 16:00, SEC v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 
403 (1972) (No. 70-61), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-61. 
 166. See id. at 29:31 (Roberts Owen arguing on behalf of respondent). 
 167.  Id. at 53:49. 
 168. See id. at 54:15. The Court’s clerk eventually invited Owen to submit a 
memorandum on mootness and he did so, filing a 16-page brief which argued that 
Dow had only ceased manufacturing napalm because it lost the contract, and that 
the company’s executives had announced that it would bid on the contract again 
in the future. See Correspondence Re: SEC v. Medical Committee for Human 
Rights, No. 70-61 from E. Robert Seaver, to Roberts B. Owen (Nov. 16, 1971) (on 
file with author) (“During the course of oral argument in this case the Court noted 
some suggestion on your part that the claim of mootness had been raised shortly 
before oral argument . . . .”); Memorandum of Respondent, the Medical 
Committee for Human Rights, on the Question of Mootness (Dec. 13, 1971) at 5, 
SEC v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403 (1972) (No. 70-61). “[I]t 
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Two days later, at conference, Justice Douglas recorded the 
preliminary votes of the seven justices on the case.169 The Chief 
Justice and Justices White and Blackmun believed the case was 
moot, but would have reversed on the merits. Justices Douglas and 
Brennan would have affirmed on the merits.170 Justices Stewart 
and Marshall believed the case was moot, and their views on the 
merits were not recorded.171 The SEC’s mootness argument had 
won, without much of an opportunity for Medical Committee to 
refute it. 
Justice Marshall wrote three drafts of his opinion in the 
case.172 The evolution of these drafts establish that Marshall had 
wanted to rebuke the SEC for its maneuvering on the issue of 
mootness.173 It also suggests that at least three of the seven 
                                                                                                     
continues to be Dow’s position that Dow can legally exclude the proposal, 
whenever it is submitted, on precisely” the grounds it offered back in 1969, the 
brief argued. Id. at 11. “Since the controversy thus continues unabated, there is 
no basis for the Commission’s after-thought that perhaps it can avoid a decision 
in this case by a belated claim of mootness.” Id.  
 169. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Handwritten Note, in THE PAPERS OF WILLIAM O. 
DOUGLAS IN THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, (1971) [hereinafter, Douglas, Nov. 12 
Conference Note] (stating: “Conference, November 12, 1971”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 170. See id. (noting that neither Douglas nor Brennan believed the case was 
moot). 
 171. See id. (noting, beside Potter Stewart’s initials, “case is moot since Dow 
put this in its proxy & now they can’t try again for 3 yrs”; a notation beside 
Thurgood Marshall’s initials states “case is moot”). 
 172. See 1st Draft, Supreme Court of the United States, No. 70-61, SEC v. 
Med. Comm. for Human Rights (undated), in THE PAPERS OF THURGOOD 
MARSHALL IN THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Supreme Court File, 1967–1991) 
[hereinafter, “Marshall, 1st Draft”]; 2nd Draft, Supreme Court of the United 
States, No. 70-61, SEC v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights (undated), in THE 
PAPERS OF THURGOOD MARSHALL IN THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Supreme Court 
File, 1967–1991); 3rd Draft, Supreme Court of the United States, No. 70-61, SEC 
v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights (undated), in THE PAPERS OF THURGOOD 
MARSHALL IN THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Supreme Court File, 1967–1991). 
 173. In his first draft opinion, Justice Marshall criticized the SEC for 
changing its position on mootness. That language, which was ultimately deleted 
from the final opinion, stated: 
We do not look with favor upon the Commission’s conduct in urging 
upon the Court, in the course of petitioning for review, that the case is 
a live controversy, and then urging that the case be dismissed as moot 
shortly before the case was set for argument. But, our dismay at the 
actions of the Commission can have no bearing on our decision here. 
Marshall, 1st Draft, supra note 172. In its brief on mootness, the Medical 
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Justices who decided the case believed that the D.C. Circuit had 
resolved the case correctly on the merits. That is, at least three of 
the seven Justices—Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall—were 
inclined to interpret the 1934 Act to require Dow to put the napalm 
resolution to a shareholder vote, had the case not been moot.  
In a first draft, Justice Marshall made his approval of the 
lower court opinion clear: 
We note in passing . . . that while the decision of the Court of 
Appeals is no longer binding upon the parties, the careful 
consideration it gave to the merits of the underlying dispute 
may prove to be instructive to the parties, Dow and any 
reviewing court in the event that this litigation is renewed at 
some future date.174 
The carefully worded sentence suggests that Justice Marshall was 
looking for a way to tacitly endorse Judge Tamm’s analysis, and 
that he believed there was sufficient support among the other 
Justices for this view. Yet this sentence provoked a quick response 
from both Justice Stewart and Justice Blackmun. Justice Stewart 
wrote to Justice Marshall that he could not join that language:  
My reasons are two-fold. First, I think the Court of Appeals was 
probably wrong, both on the appealability of the SEC’s “no 
action recommendation” and on the includability of the proxy 
material. Second, even if I agreed on the merits, I think it is 
inappropriate to express our views in a case that we are 
disposing of as moot.175  
Justice Blackmun objected to the same part of the draft opinion 
and expressed the view that the D.C. Circuit had gotten the merits 
of the case wrong.176 He wrote that he found it “hard to agree with” 
                                                                                                     
Committee vigorously contested the SEC’s claim that Dow had permanently 
ceased to manufacture napalm for the U.S. government. See Memorandum of 
Respondent, the Medical Committee for Human Rights, on the Question of 
Mootness (Dec. 13, 1971), SEC v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403 
(1972) (No. 70-61).  
 174. Id. (citation omitted). 
 175. POTTER STEWART, Note from Justice Potter Stewart, to Justice Thurgood 
Marshall, in THE PAPERS OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS IN THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
(Dec. 21, 1971).  
 176. See HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Correspondence from Harry A. Blackmun, to 
Thurgood Marshall, in THE PAPERS OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS IN THE LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS (Dec. 22, 1971) (“If your proposed opinion were to end with the 11th 
line on page 4 (plus, of course, the last three lines on page 5), I could join it.”); 
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the D.C. Circuit’s determination that the proposal did not fall 
within the rule’s exclusion: 
The particular issue here smacks, to me, of the kind of thing to 
which the exclusions apply, namely, a political issue and an 
issue affecting corporate management, to wit, the 
determination of what products to manufacture. Surely, if Dow 
tomorrow decided to make traveling bags, we could hardly 
expect formal court review of the SEC’s decision not to force that 
kind of proposition into a proxy statement.177 
Ultimately, Justice Marshall removed the language stating that 
the parties should consider the D.C. Circuit’s analysis 
“instructive.” In its final draft, the opinion merely said that the 
controversy had become moot.178 
                                                                                                     
HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Notes from Justice Harry Blackmun in SEC v. Medical 
Committee for Human Rights (undated) at 2, in SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAPERS (1972) (“Somewhat to my surprise, 
Judge Tamm, on behalf of the panel, held that the matter was reviewable and 
remanded the case to the SEC for more formal and informative determinations.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 177. BLACKMUN, Notes from Justice Harry Blackmun in SEC v. Medical 
Committee for Human Rights, supra note 176, at 2.  
 178. The case was moot, Justice Marshall wrote, because Dow had 
“acquiesced” in Medical Committee’s submission of the same proposal in January 
1971, had included the proposal in its 1971 proxy statement, and had allowed a 
vote of Dow’s shareholders at the 1971 annual meeting, at which the proposal had 
received so few votes that it could now be excluded “for the next three years.” SEC 
v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 406 (1972). “We find that this 
series of events has mooted the controversy.” Id. It is worth noting that Justice 
Marshall’s explanation included a small error: he wrote that “[l]ess than 3% of all 
voting shareholders supported” the resolution, rendering it excludable under Rule 
14a-8(c)(4)(i), but in fact the relevant inquiry under that rule was the percentage 
of shares that were voted in favor of the proposal, not the percentage of 
shareholders who so voted. Id. at 403. Since the majority treated the 1971 vote as 
dispositive of mootness, it is interesting that the opinion characterized that vote 
inaccurately. The Court acknowledged Medical Committee’s argument that Dow 
was likely to refuse inclusion of its proposal in the future, but wrote that: 
[w]hether or not the Committee will actually resubmit its proposal or 
a similar one in 1974 is purely a matter of conjecture at this point as is 
whether or not Dow will accept it. If Dow were likely to repeat its 
allegedly illegal conduct, the case would not be moot. However, in light 
of the meager support the proposal attracted, we can only speculate 
that Dow will continue to include the proposal when it again becomes 
eligible for inclusion, rather than to repeat this litigation. Thus, we find 
that “the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected 
to recur.” 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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Justice William O. Douglas produced the sole dissent.179 
Justice Douglas was the only one of the seven Justices who had 
experience as a securities lawyer and had, in fact, served as the 
SEC’s Chair from 1937 to 1939.180 While Chair of the SEC, Douglas 
had proposed the creation of “public” corporate directors, who 
would represent “not only the present but the potential 
stockholder,” and “the general public as well.”181 Douglas was also 
well-known to have opposed the Vietnam War.182 
Justice Douglas’s dissent in SEC v. Medical Committee for 
Human Rights characterized the case as a private dispute between 
Medical Committee and Dow with “large public overtones.”183 It 
was not moot, he argued. “Dow has for the past four years fought 
                                                                                                     
 179. See id. at 407–11 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Although Justice Douglas had 
recorded that Justice Brennan shared his views on mootness and substance a few 
weeks earlier, Justice Brennan did not join his dissent. 
 180. Notwithstanding this fact, Douglas’s “uncharacteristically cautious 
pattern of recusing himself in cases involving [the SEC] meant that he rarely 
participated in securities cases.” A. C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, 
Securities Law and the New Deal Justices, 95 VA. L. REV. 841, 846 (2009). 
Pritchard and Thompson wrote that most of Douglas’s securities opinions “show 
up in the last four years of his tenure,” a period that included SEC v. Med. Comm. 
for Human Rights in 1972, and the “string of dissents Douglas wrote in the 1970s 
after the Court’s majority had taken a more restrictive turn in securities law” was 
not “significant”: “The bottom line is that Douglas had little impact on the Court’s 
securities jurisprudence for his entire career.” Id. at 919. By 1972, Justice 
Douglas was near the end of his service on the nation’s high court. He would retire 
three years later, in 1975, after 36 years on the Court. See Justice Douglas Retires 
from the Supreme Court, Ending the Longest Tenure as an Active Justice, 62 
A.B.A. J. 87, 87 (1976) (noting Justice Douglas retired on November 12, 1975). 
 181. William O. Douglas, Corporation Directors, in DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE: 
THE ADDRESSES AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS AS MEMBER AND 
CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 53 (James Allen, ed., 
1940) (reprint of an address delivered at Fort Worth, Texas, on January 8, 1939); 
see also Harwell Wells, A Long View of Shareholder Power: From the Antebellum 
Corporation to the Twenty-First Century, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1033, 1073 (2015) 
(describing more about Douglas’s views about corporate governance); see also, 
generally, A. C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law and the New 
Deal Justices, 95 VA. L. REV. 841 (2009); Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream 
of William O. Douglas—the Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge 
of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79 (2005). 
  182. See Michal R. Belknap, The Warren Court and the Vietnam War: The 
Limits of Legal Liberalism, 33 GA. L. REV. 65, 90–94 (1998) (noting that Justices 
Black, Stewart, Brennan, and “probably” Marshall joined Justice Douglas in his 
opposition to the war). 
 183. SEC v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 408 (1972) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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tooth and nail its obligation to include this shareholder proposal,” 
he wrote:184 
The modern super-corporations, of which Dow is one, wield 
immense, virtually unchecked power. Some say that they are 
“private governments,” whose decisions affect the lives of us all. 
The philosophy of our times, I think, requires that such 
enterprises be held to a higher standard than of the “morals of 
the marketplace” which exalts a single-minded, myopic 
determination to maximize profits as the traditional be-all and 
end-all of corporate concern. The “public interest in having the 
legality of the practices settled, militates against a mootness 
conclusion.”185 
Justice Douglas’s experience at securities enforcement was 
evidenced by his analysis. He noted the economic advantage Dow 
enjoyed over a shareholder like Medical Committee, observing that 
Dow might “decide its superior financial position makes continued 
litigation” preferable to inclusion in future years.186 In a footnote, 
he also pointed out that the SEC had “recently proposed 
amendments to its proxy rules which might strengthen Dow’s 
hand.”187 He also noted that “substantial sentiment” preferred “a 
more liberal approach to shareholder proxy proposals than is 
evidenced by the current, much less the proposed, rules.”188 
However, he stopped short of arguing that the SEC had erred by 
not forcing Dow to include the proposal in its proxy in 1969. 
The Court’s decision, which declared the case moot and 
vacated the decision of the D.C. Circuit, was released on January 
10, 1972.189 Although it purported to make no decision, it was a 
win for Dow and, more broadly, for corporate managers. 
                                                                                                     
 184. Id. at 409. 
 185. Id. at 409–10 (quoting U.S. v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953)). 
186. Id. at 410. 
 187. Id. at 410 n.6.  
 188. Id. The last line of his dissent criticized the majority for what he 
characterized as a string of recent cases in which the Supreme Court had 
“abdicat[ed] its constitutional responsibility” to decide cases. Id. at 410. These 
were: Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244 
(1971); and McClanahan v. Morauer & Hartzell, Inc., 404 U.S. 16 (1971). None of 
these cases touched on the Vietnam War or shareholder democracy. 
 189. See High Court to Decide if FCC Can Make Big CATV Systems Originate 
Programs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 1972, at 4 (reporting that “the dismissal leaves 
unresolved whether federal appeals courts can review Securities and Exchange 
Commission decisions on proxy material”).  
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Within a few days of the Supreme Court’s decision, the SEC’s 
Office of the General Counsel had recommended that the Division 
of Corporation Finance end altogether its practice of offering 
interpretive advice on Rule 14a-8. The staff of the Division opposed 
this idea and the SEC ultimately did not pursue it.190 However, the 
SEC continued to make efforts to narrow shareholders’ power to 
bring social or environmental proposals. In 1976, the SEC 
amended Rule 14a-8 to make it harder for shareholders to bring a 
successful proposal. The SEC advanced the deadline for a 
shareholder to submit a proposal from 70 to 90 days, for example, 
limited each proponent to a maximum of two proposals per 
meeting, and limited the length of the proposal itself to 300 
words.191  
Meanwhile, Dow received two shareholder proposals for its 
1972 annual meeting and promptly excluded them.192 It appears 
likely that the SEC played along by granting Dow no-action letters 
for both.193 The substance of the two proposals is not known, 
                                                                                                     
 190. In a memo, it argued that “[w]hile the Division shares the concern of the 
General Counsel’s Office about the prospects for future Medical Committee type 
litigation, it does not believe that the proposed release provides an appropriate 
answer to the problem.” Memorandum from The Div. of Corp. Fin. to the SEC 
(Jan. 15, 1972) (on file with author). It continued: “[i]f the Commission at a future 
time desires to review the staff comments on a shareholder proposal matter, 
consideration can then be given to Medical Committee problems in the light of the 
particular facts of the matter presented for review.” Id. It notes that “the factor 
that required most of the staff’s time during the last proxy season, i.e. Rodney 
Shields’ proposals, has been dealt with in a manner that will not require 
significant staff time in the future.” Id. It also narrowed the shareholder 
eligibility requirements, creating a contemporaneous holding requirement. 
Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange 
Act Release No. 12,999, 1976 SEC LEXIS 326, at *8–16 (Nov. 22, 1976). 
 191. Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, 
Exchange Act Release No. 12,999, 1976 SEC LEXIS 326, at *8–16 (Nov. 22, 1976). 
 192. See THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, PROXY STATEMENT FOR ANNUAL 
MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS TO BE HELD MAY 3, 1972 11 (Mar. 17, 1972) (“The 
company has received from two stockholders proposals which under the proxy 
rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission may be omitted from this proxy 
statement.”) (on filed with author). 
 193. See id. This is the same language that Dow used in 1969 and 1970 in 
connection with its exclusion of Medical Committee’s proposal in those years, 
which suggests that Dow received no-action letters in 1972 as it had in those 
earlier years. See THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, PROXY STATEMENT FOR ANNUAL 
MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS TO BE HELD MAY 7, 1969 (Mar. 25, 1969); THE DOW 
CHEMICAL COMPANY, PROXY STATEMENT FOR ANNUAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS 
TO BE HELD MAY 6, 1970 (Mar. 20, 1970) (on file with author). 
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though archival documents from Medical Committee’s files suggest 
that Medical Committee tried to submit its napalm proposal again 
in 1972.194 Dow’s 1972 meeting was picketed by striking workers, 
according to news reports.195  
In 1974, Dow’s unionized workers announced a strike, and the 
company moved its annual meeting to Miami, Florida, likely to 
thwart protests.196 The following year, it moved the meeting to 
Texas.197 No shareholder proposals were submitted in advance of 
Dow’s 1973, 1974, 1975, or 1976 meetings.198 During this time, 
Dow was breaking records for profitability and, by 1976, Dow’s two 
highest-ranked executives—its board chair and its  
president—were the second and fourth highest-paid executives in 
America.199 
                                                                                                     
 194. The Supreme Court decided SEC v. Medical Committee for Human 
Rights on January 10, 1972, which gave Medical Committee a short window in 
which to re-submit its napalm proposal before the 1972 deadline. 
 195. See Stockholder Meeting Briefs, WALL ST. J., May 4, 1972, at 28 (meeting 
was picketed by about 75 workers). 
 196. See THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, REVISED NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING 
OF STOCKHOLDERS TO BE HELD MAY 8, 1974 (Mar. 26, 1974) (“Because of the 
unsettled conditions in Midland resulting from this strike [by the United 
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC and Local 12075], your Board of 
Directors has decided to change the place of the annual meeting . . . .”) (on file 
with author); Dow Chemical Shift of Its Meeting Site Proves Successful, WALL ST. 
J., May 9, 1974 (stating that Dow moved its annual meeting “to avoid possible 
disruption by striking worker” and this tactic “paid off” since “only two union 
members attended”). 
 197. THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING OF 
STOCKHOLDERS TO BE HELD MAY 7, 1975 (Mar. 21, 1975) (noting the meeting for a 
high school in Freeport, Texas) (on file with author). The annual meeting was 
back in Midland in 1976. See THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, NOTICE OF ANNUAL 
MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS TO BE HELD MAY 5, 1976 (Mar. 19, 1976) (on file with 
author). 
 198. This assumes that Dow continued its practice of noting in its proxy when 
it had excluded a proposal. See THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, PROXY STATEMENT 
FOR ANNUAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS TO BE HELD MAY 2, 1973 11 (no such 
notation) (on file with author); THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, PROXY STATEMENT 
FOR ANNUAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS TO BE HELD MAY 8, 1974 11 (same) (on file 
with author); THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, PROXY STATEMENT FOR ANNUAL 
MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS TO BE HELD MAY 7, 1975 11 (same); THE DOW 
CHEMICAL COMPANY, PROXY STATEMENT FOR ANNUAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS 
TO BE HELD May 5, 1976 11 (same) (on file with author). 
 199. Dow’s 1974 Profit, Sales Set Records, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1975, at E11; 
Gray, United Technologies Chief, Led U.S. in Pay at $1.66 Million, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 13, 1977, at D5 (C. B. Branch was then Dow’s board chair, while Zoltan 
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Medical Committee would never again engage in a campaign 
of shareholder activism. The civil rights organization quietly closed 
shop a few years after its defeat in SEC v. Medical Committee for 
Human Rights, and its Dow stock was presumably sold off.200  
IV. Postscript 
What key points can we take away from the battle that played 
out among Medical Committee, Dow, and the SEC between 1968 
and 1972? Three important ones stand out. 
First, the evidence suggests that, if it had been decided on the 
merits, SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights would have 
been a close case. The Justices’ papers give away their initial 
positions on the underlying substantive issues and show that three 
of the seven Justices apparently found support for the D.C. 
Circuit’s expansive view of corporate democracy.201 This is itself 
significant. Today, the idea that the annual shareholders meeting 
should function as a referendum on a corporation’s social policies 
and political activities is widely rejected by the corporate law 
academy. The very idea is considered ridiculous. But it was not 
considered ridiculous by the D.C. Circuit in 1970, nor was it 
considered ridiculous by Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall 
in 1972.202 Our historical reflection on SEC v. Medical Committee 
for Human Rights highlights how, even without an authoritative 
determination by the Supreme Court, widespread consensus on the 
meaning of “corporate democracy” has narrowed sharply since the 
1970s. It invites us to rethink the scope and meaning of “corporate 
                                                                                                     
Merszei was president). 
 200. See John Dittmer, The Medical Committee for Human Rights, AMA J. OF 
ETHICS (Sept. 2014), https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/medical-
committee-human-rights/2014-09 (last visited Sept. 6, 2019) (stating that the 
Medical Committee for Human Rights declined in the 1970s and did not survive 
through the Reagan administration) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 201. Of course, we cannot know how the case would have been resolved if the 
SEC had not prevailed with its last-minute claim of mootness. The successful 
mootness claim likely cut off the Justices’ consideration of the merits of the 
dispute.  
 202. See supra notes 129–35 and accompanying text; see also supra notes  
169–188 and accompanying text. 
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democracy” at a time when shareholders again are pushing 
boundaries and demanding reforms. 
Second, conservative Judge Edward Allen Tamm authored 
both the unanimous decision of the D.C. Circuit in Medical 
Committee for Human Rights v. SEC and, a few years later, an 
important dissent in Buckley v. Valeo, which was endorsed by the 
Supreme Court in what has become an iconic case about money as 
speech.203 In Medical Committee, Tamm suggested that federal law 
entitled shareholders to robust rights of corporate democracy, 
including the right to turn the annual meeting into a referendum 
on the corporation’s sale of a politically controversial product.204 In 
his dissent in Buckley, Tamm argued that money should be treated 
as protected speech in some circumstances.205 Soon after the 
Supreme Court decided Buckley, it extended political speech rights 
to corporations in First National Bank v. Bellotti.206 The views that 
Tamm expressed in Medical Committee and Buckley can be read 
together, particularly in light of Bellotti’s extension of political 
speech rights to corporations, to present a cohesive take on 
corporate political spending. Tamm advocated both a robust voice 
for shareholders in a corporation’s political activity, and a 
speech-protective approach to political spending—strong 
shareholder voice within the firm, and strong speech rights for 
those who spend money to influence elections.207 In the work of 
Judge Tamm, we can see the outline of a different—and perhaps a 
                                                                                                     
 203. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 253–54 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (discussing Judge Tamm’s dissenting from the 
decision of the Court of Appeals). 
 204. See Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 676 (D.C. Cir. 
1970), vacated 404 U.S. 403 (1972) (stating that section 14 of the Securities 
Exchange Act is intended to give shareholders the ability to engage in true 
corporate democracy). 
 205. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Tamm, J., 
dissenting) (concluding that campaign expenditures are intertwined with political 
communication and should be protected speech), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 424 
U.S. 1 (1976). 
 206. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). For a contemporary take on Bellotti, see Nikolas 
Bowie, Corporate Democracy: How Corporations Justified Their Right to Speak in 
1970s Boston, 36 L. & HIST. REV. 943, 992 (2018) (arguing that “corporations are 
fundamentally representative institutions” in which “a vocal person purports to 
represent a silent group”). 
 207. See supra notes 204–05. 
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more satisfying—jurisprudence than the one we have ended up 
with. 
Finally, it is significant that Dow stopped producing napalm 
around the time of its 1969 shareholders meeting—even before the 
D.C. Circuit ruled against it in the summer of 1970.208 Although 
Dow’s managers never said they had stopped making napalm to 
placate the company’s dissenting shareholders, the timing of 
events suggests that Medical Committee prevailed. This part of the 
story hints at the power of shareholder activism, particularly when 
combined with boycotts and protests, to shape the choices of 
corporate managers. Medical Committee lost the litigation, but it 
won its demand that Dow stop producing napalm for use in the 
Vietnam War. 
The next three subsections provide some additional thoughts 
on the case as civil rights history and corporate governance history. 
A. The Civil Rights Movement and SEC v. Medical Committee for 
Human Rights 
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education ended segregation as a matter of constitutional law in 
1954, but did not lead to desegregation.209 As Christopher W. 
Schmidt has written, “[w]hat Brown did was raise expectations for 
change that failed to materialize. This, in turn, fueled skepticism, 
even antagonism, toward litigation as a pathway to racial justice” 
among civil rights activists.210 Having learned from Brown that 
court victories did not translate into easy change, activists changed 
tactics. In the winter of 1960, the lunch counter sit-in movement 
took shape as “a break with the accepted tradition of change, of 
legislation and the courts.”211 Of course, the targets of the 
movement were businesses, many of them publicly-held. 
                                                                                                     
 208. Dow Declares it has Stopped Production of Napalm for U.S., N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 15, 1969, at 34. 
 209. See CHRISTOPHER W. SCHMIDT, THE SIT-INS: PROTEST & LEGAL CHANGE IN 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 29 (2018) (“In the five states of the Deep South, there were 
1.4 million black schoolchildren. Not one attended a racially mixed school in the 
years between 1954 and 1960. In the Upper South, the numbers were only 
marginally better, representing nothing more than token efforts at compliance.”). 
 210. Id. at 31. 
 211. Id. at 32 (quoting James Lawson, From a Lunch-Counter Stool, Speech 
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Direct shareholder activism—in which progressive 
stockholders of variety store companies demanded top-down 
desegregation from corporate managers—was part of the lunch 
counter sit-in movement. This shareholder activism reflected a 
choice by activists to move beyond public law reform and target 
powerful private institutions, on those institutions’ own terms. The 
rules that governed this form of activism were federal securities 
law and state corporate law. 
A few civil rights activists had been using shareholder tools to 
engage with companies since the late 1940s. James Peck, a white 
activist, had made early but unsuccessful efforts to use the 
shareholder proposal to desegregate seating on buses owned by the 
Greyhound bus company.212 By the mid-1950s, Peck and other 
members of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) were using 
stock and proxies to gain admittance to the annual meetings of 
national chain stores to urge company leaders to desegregate their 
lunch counters.213  
For activists discouraged by Brown, national businesses may 
have looked like promising targets for civil rights reform. 
Corporations were sensitive to negative press, and many southern 
variety stores—including the W. T. Grant Company, the S. H. 
Kress Company, and the F. W. Woolworth Company—were 
managed from the North.214 At least in the beginning, the 
                                                                                                     
at Shaw University, Raleigh, North Carolina (Apr. 15, 1960), in AUGUST MEIER ET 
AL., BLACK PROTEST THOUGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 308–15 (1971)). 
 212. See Harwell Wells, A Long View of Shareholder Power: From the 
Antebellum Corporation to the Twenty-First Century, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1033,  
1081–82 (2015) (describing Peck’s activism); see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Social 
Activism Through Shareholder Activism, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1129 (2019). 
 213. See Yearbook of Congress of Racial Equality 1942–1970, U. WASH. 
MAPPING AM. SOC. MOVEMENTS (2015), 
http://depts.washington.edu/moves/CORE_yearbook.shtml (last visited Sept. 6, 
2019) (identifying instances where CORE attended annual stockholder meetings) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
214. See W.T. Grant, Facing $175-Million Loss to Close 126 Stores and Lay 
Off 12,600, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1975, at 45 (indicating W.T. Grant’s home offices 
were located in New York); Charlotte C. Egerton, More than a Matter of Nickels 
and Dimes: S.H. Kress Stores in the New South, U.N.C. WILMINGTON DEP’T 
HISTORY 1, 16 (2012) (stating Kress had headquarters in New York City), 
http://dl.uncw.edu/Etd/2012-1/egertonc/charlotteegerton.pdf; Woolworth Co., 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Woolworth-Co (last 
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procedures followed at corporate annual meetings were generous 
to stockholders: once inside the meeting, a stockholder could 
usually get time at the microphone to give his or her views to 
corporate leaders.215 Before the 1970 proxy season, when many 
companies began employing strategies to control attendance and 
silence stockholders, shareholders enjoyed significant freedom to 
express their views at the meeting—and so did individuals who 
came armed only with a stockholder’s proxy, which companies 
honored.216 It did not hurt that companies’ annual meetings were 
often covered by major newspapers, which meant that stockholder 
questions and protests sometimes made the news.217 
In 1954, Peck used a single share of stock in W. T. Grant to 
demand, successfully, that the company desegregate its lunch 
counters in Baltimore, but he was unsuccessful six years later, 
when he returned to W. T. Grant’s annual meeting to press the 
board to desegregate its stores in the South.218 A young CORE 
member named Barbara Broxton used a shareholder’s proxy to 
gain admittance to Woolworth’s 1960 annual meeting.219 She had 
just been released from forty-eight days in a Tallahassee jail after 
her arrest at a Woolworth lunch counter.220 At the meeting, 
Broxton looked the company’s owners and managers in the eye and 
told them that she and other activists would not back down.221  
                                                                                                     
visited Sept. 6, 2019) (stating that Woolworth’s headquarters were in New York 
City) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 215. See, e.g., infra notes 218–219 and accompanying text; infra notes  
224–233 and accompanying text. 
216. See, e.g., infra notes 225–227. 
 217. See, e.g., supra note 195 (Wall Street Journal coverage of stockholder 
meetings). 
 218. See W.T. Grant Defends Lunch Counter Racial Bar, N.Y. TIMES, April 27, 
1960, at 49. 
 219. See GLENDA ALICE RABBY, THE PAIN AND THE PROMISE 119 (1999) 
(describing Barbara Broxton’s attendance at Woolworth’s annual shareholders 
meeting). 
 220. See Letter from a Jailed Student, CORE-lator Newsletter, April 1960, at 
1, https://www.crmvet.org/docs/core/core6004.pdf [hereinafter Letter from a 
Jailed Student] (stating that students were charged with “disturbing the peace, 
inciting to riot, and disrupting the peaceful tranquility of the community”; after 
they were released on bond pending trial, five more charges were added). 
 221. Woolworth Posts Sales Gain, Defends Exclusion of Negroes, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 19, 1960, at 55:  
Miss Barbara Broxton, a 20-year-old Negro student of Florida A. and 
M. College in Tallahassee, who spent forty-eight days in jail on a 
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In 1967, a grass-roots Rochester organization, Freedom, 
Integration, God, Honor—Today (FIGHT), gathered proxies for 
Eastman Kodak Company’s annual meeting to protest the 
company’s policies on race and employment.222 FIGHT staged a 
demonstration outside the meeting and sent proxy-wielding 
members inside to engage with the board and shareholders.223 Its 
activism produced a compromise and may have helped set the 
stage for Medical Committee’s efforts the following year.224  
As this history reveals, civil rights shareholder activism was 
evolving rapidly in sophistication, and Medical Committee’s efforts 
are a key part of that story. In a first step, civil rights activists 
moved beyond consumer protests and boycotts and began staging 
demonstrations outside companies’ annual meetings.225 In a next 
                                                                                                     
trespassing charge involving a sit-in at a Woolworth lunch counter, 
told the stockholders that the ‘colored people will continue their fight 
and will continue to go to jail because we feel we are right.’ She is not 
a stockholder but had a proxy which allowed her into the meeting. 
See also Letter from a Jailed Student, supra note 220, at 1.  
 222. In late 1966, an executive of Eastman Kodak Co. had signed an 
agreement with FIGHT that committed the company to hire 600 “unskilled” 
African-Americans in Rochester, New York. See Kodak Directors Drop Executive, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1967, at 24. The agreement was so controversial within the 
company that Eastman Kodak repudiated it two days later and the executive who 
signed on Eastman Kodak’s behalf was publicly demoted. Id. At the company’s 
shareholder meeting on April 25, 1967, 700 demonstrators picketed outside. Id. 
Inside, a “dramatic confrontation” occurred when an African-American cleric, 
Franklin D. R. Florence, spoke on behalf of several religious institutional 
investors, holding roughly $7.5 million of Eastman Kodak’s stock, who had 
refused to sign management proxies in protest of the company’s actions. See 
William R. MacKaye, Church Gains Noted in Kodak Meeting, WASH. POST, Apr. 
29, 1967, at E4; Nicholas van Hoffman, Picture’s Fuzzy as Kodak Fights FIGHT, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1967, at A3. Following the shareholder meeting, in late May, 
“with racial tensions on the rise in many cities across the country,” Eastman 
Kodak reached a compromise agreement with FIGHT. Earl C. Gottschalk Jr., 
Kodak’s Ordeal: How a Firm That Meant Well Won a Bad Name For Its Race 
Relations, WALL ST. J., June 30, 1967, at 1. For a description of the Rochester race 
riots which preceded FIGHT’s activism, see, e.g., Joseph Lelyveld, Riots Viewed 
Against History of Clashes Almost as Old as U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1964, at 
23 (noting the “deeper cause” of the “discontent” was “poverty, joblessness, 
discrimination, hopelessness”). 
 223. See Kodak Directors Drop Executive, supra note 222. 
 224. The founder of FIGHT, Saul O. Alinsky, told the New York Times that he 
felt that “shareholder action can be a powerful new weapon for promoting civil 
rights and advancing the war on poverty.” M. J. Rossant, Finance: All You Need 
is One Share, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1967, at E6.  
 225. See supra Part II.D (describing protests at annual stockholder meetings 
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step, activists gathered shareholder proxies—or bought one or two 
shares of stock—to gain admittance to the meeting.226 Once inside 
the annual meeting, they could speak directly to company owners 
and managers and nominate candidates for the board. Indeed, 
beginning in the late 1960s, a number of civil rights leaders were 
nominated—unsuccessfully—to the boards of public companies,227 
and Jackie Robinson, then a national vice president of the NAACP, 
made headlines when he became the co-chair of the board of a 
major insurance company.228 
Around the time that Medical Committee began to engage 
Dow’s management about napalm, African-American shareholders 
were raising concerns at other companies during the annual 
meeting. For several successive years, for example, black 
shareholders of the Ford Motor Company spoke at the company’s 
annual meeting to raise concerns related to the company’s 
relationship with the black community, prompting Henry Ford II 
himself to respond.229  
                                                                                                     
of various companies). 
 226. See supra Part IV.A (discussing how shareholders used proxies and stock 
to gain admittance to meetings to discuss concerns with management). 
 227. For example, in 1968, a shareholder nominated Cora T. Walker, the civil 
rights activist, for a directorship at AT&T from the floor of the meeting. See AT&T 
Earnings Climbed to Mark During March, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 1968, at 3 
(reporting that Wilma Soss nominated Cora T. Walker, “president of the Harlem 
Lawyers Association and a well-known civil rights leader”; Walker received 
80,000 votes but did not win). In 1964, shareholders of the Communications 
Satellite Corp. booed an activist at the company’s annual meeting who demanded 
to know why none of the company’s officers or directors were black. First Comsat 
Meeting has Helmeted Holder, a Horn—and Questions, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 
1964, at 12. The company’s board chair retorted that it would have violated the 
Civil Rights Act—enacted months earlier—to choose directors on the basis of race. 
Id. In December, a black stockholder of Genesco Inc. nominated two black 
candidates for the board from the floor of a stockholder meeting. Stockholder 
Meeting Briefs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1970, at 29 (“Stockholders rejected an attempt 
by a Negro shareholder to have a Negro man and a Negro woman added to the 
board. The board remains all white and all male.”). 
 228. Jackie Robinson Joins Insurer as a Stockholder and Director, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 23, 1966, at 70. 
 229. In 1968, one African-American stockholder asked when Ford would set 
up a dealership to serve black car buyers in Detroit, and another raised a concern 
about the company’s employment practices regarding race. See The Big 
Companies Venture Their to [sic] Help in the Civil Rights Effort, WALL ST. J., June 
14, 1968, at 20. The article also documented instances in the 1968 proxy season 
when corporate managers heard from white shareholders complaining about 
companies’ progressive race policies and activities. Id. The following year, 
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Medical Committee participated in demonstrations outside 
Dow’s annual meeting and sent chapter members inside to speak, 
but the group’s decision to tee up a reform through a proposal to 
amend the company’s charter—and to demand that its proposal be 
transmitted to all of Dow’s shareholders well in advance of the 
meeting, under SEC Rule 14a-8—was a shot across the bow of 
corporate managers.230 Though James Peck, acting in his 
individual capacity, had tried something similar in 1949, Medical 
Committee was a national organization with resources that 
eventually came to include a partner at one of the nation’s most 
prestigious law firms and assistance from a former SEC general 
counsel.231 Medical Committee also had some religious 
institutional investors on its side, although some of these chose to 
divest, which prevented them from supporting the napalm 
proposal with their votes.232 
As activists learned post-Medical Committee, it was difficult 
to effect change through shareholder activism. The procedures of 
corporate democracy worked slowly: unless you could marshal the 
holders of a significant amount of stock, the process played out over 
a year-long cycle which offered a single opportunity for the 
expression of shareholder voice. A shareholder-proponent who 
missed the submission deadline was left to wait a full year before 
trying again. After the events of 1970, including the tumultuous 
proxy season and the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Medical Committee, 
the business community was largely successful at making the 
shareholder proposal mechanism more difficult and costly.  
Corporate democracy is not like political democracy. In 
political democracy, every voter is equal at the ballot box and has 
                                                                                                     
“Herbert Thompson, Detroit Negro owner of a shoe store and a Ford stockholder” 
asked again about the prospects of a Ford dealership in Detroit, prompting 
another response from Henry Ford II. Stockholders Back Ford Management, 
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, May 9, 1969, at 14. 
 230. See supra Part I.A (discussing Medical Committee’s shareholder 
proposal to Dow). 
 231. See Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
 232. See, e.g., Dow Stock is Sold by Union Seminary, supra note 65 (reporting 
that Union Theological Seminary divested itself of 6,000 shares of Dow stock to 
protest Dow’s manufacture of napalm); Chemical Stock Sold as Protest, supra note 
65, at B-19 (reporting that Massachusetts Conference of the United Church of 
Christ took a $15,000 loss to divest itself of Dow stock to protest Dow’s 
manufacture of napalm). 
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one vote to cast. In corporate democracy, voting power is 
determined by investment; a stockholder can cast only as many 
votes as the number of shares she owns. Civil rights groups and 
their members were not likely to own much stock in the 1960s and 
70s.233 What is more, the trend in which institutional investors, 
like churches and universities, pursued socially responsible 
investment through divestment and screens, rather than by 
directly engaging management in an intra-corporate fight, meant 
that civil rights groups advancing social reforms through 
shareholder activism had even fewer votes to work with. 
The D.C. Circuit’s path-breaking opinion in July 1970 signaled 
that activists had found a promising new avenue for change. 
However, the early successes of groups like Medical Committee 
were almost immediately met by significant opposition from the 
business community. Ultimately, the business community was 
able to force a return to the previous status quo: tight control by 
management of corporate social and political decision-making. 
B. SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights as Corporate 
Governance History 
SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights was taught in 
corporate law casebooks for a decade or more before fading into 
obscurity.234 Yet the subject it explored—the scope and meaning of 
corporate democracy—could not be more relevant today.  
                                                                                                     
 233. Medical Committee provides one example; it never owned more than five 
shares of Dow stock.   
 234. Like many other corporate law casebooks published in the 1970s and 
1980s, the 1986 edition of the West corporate law casebook authored by Lewis D. 
Solomon, Donald E. Schwartz, and Jeffrey D. Bauman included a lengthy excerpt 
of Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC in its chapter on “Shareholder 
Action and Proxy Regulation.” See LEWIS D. SOLOMON, DONALD E. SCHWARTZ & 
JEFFREY D. BAUMAN, CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY: MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 
574–79 (2d ed. 1988) (excerpting the D.C. Circuit opinion). The next edition of the 
same casebook, published in 1994, mentioned the case only in the notes. See LEWIS 
D. SOLOMON, DONALD E. SCHWARTZ, JEFFREY D. BAUMAN & ELLIOTT J. WEISS, 
CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY: MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 614, 631–33 (3d ed. 
1994). For examples of other corporate law casebooks published in the 1970s and 
1980s that included the case, see, e.g., LARRY D. SODERQUIST & A.A. SOMMER, JR., 
CORPORATIONS: A PROBLEM APPROACH 462–68 (2d ed. 1986) (excerpting the D.C. 
Circuit opinion); RICHARD W. JENNINGS & RICHARD M. BUXBAUM, CORPORATIONS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 315–25 (5th ed. 1979) (excerpting both the D.C. Circuit and 
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1. The “Politicization” of the Firm 
When the D.C. Circuit endorsed a broad view of corporate 
democracy in Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC in July 
1970, commentators warned that the decision would lead to the 
“politicization” of the firm. Business leaders cautioned against the 
transformation of the annual shareholder meeting into a popular 
referendum on all of a company’s social, political, and 
environmental policies. Dow’s general counsel, Groening, told the 
Wall Street Journal that the SEC would face an “enormous task” 
in handling all the social and political proposals to come.235 The 
D.C. Circuit hadn’t seemed particularly worried about this 
possibility, so long as the communications and debate were in 
accord with state law. Yet corporate managers strongly opposed 
the prospect of facing down dissenting shareholders in a 
quasi-democratic forum once a year.236 
Shortly after the D.C. Circuit handed down its decision, the 
ABA’s Section on Business Law sponsored a meeting of securities 
law professors. The “danger” of the “greater politicization of 
corporate affairs” was a major subject of discussion.237 Present at 
the meeting were two academics who would lead the discussion 
                                                                                                     
Supreme Court opinions); but see WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, 
CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 1988) (omitting mention of the 
case). Today, few of the major corporate law casebooks include the case. See, e.g., 
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. COX, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (12th ed. 2019) (omitting any mention of the case).  
 235. SEC Reviewing Rules on Holder Proposals in Proxy Statements, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 9, 1970, at 12 (“Mr. Groening said Dow feels there are ‘serious 
questions’ about the relationship of such proposals to ‘the spirit of the Securities 
and Exchange Act.’ He said the company considers the commission’s 
re-examination of the subject to be entirely appropriate’ at this time.”). 
 236. See supra Part IV.A (assessing how corporate managers were keen on 
making it more difficult for stockholders to present dissenting views at the 
company’s annual shareholder meeting). 
 237. Henry G. Manne, The Myth of Corporate Responsibility or Will the Real 
Ralph Nader Please Stand Up, 26 BUS. LAW. 533, 539 (1970). The Business Lawyer 
published the papers presented at the meeting, which was held in St. Louis on 
August 11, 1970, as well as a transcript of comments made on the panel by several 
notable scholars. See generally Wilbur G. Katz, Introduction, 26 BUS. LAW. 511 
(1970); Comments by Panelists, 26 BUS. LAW. 549, 549–54 (1970). Phillip I. 
Blumberg echoed Professor Manne’s warning about the politicization of the firm. 
See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Politicalization of the Corporation, 26 BUS. LAW. 
1551, 1551 (1971). 
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from opposite ends of the ideological spectrum: Henry Manne, at 
the time a professor in the political science department at the 
University of Rochester,238 and Donald E. Schwartz, the 
Georgetown law professor who had helped to lead Campaign GM. 
Manne argued forcefully against the politicization of the firm.239 
“[T]he corporation is politicized,”240 Schwartz retorted, pointing to 
Dow as an example. Dow, he explained, had:  
objected to the effort to try to get them out of the napalm 
business, because they said they weren’t making a profit on 
napalm but they were doing this in spite of the fact that there 
was no profit. Now I think that’s an interesting fact. If Dow did 
not produce napalm to make money, why did it do it? To serve 
our country’s goals as management saw them. That is a 
political, not a business judgment, and shareholders have as 
much right, if not more, to make that kind of judgment as does 
management.241 
                                                                                                     
 238. Manne, a founder of the law and economics field, published several works 
early in his academic career that challenged the corporate social responsibility 
movement. See, e.g., HENRY G. MANNE & HENRY CHRISTOPHER WALLICH, THE 
MODERN CORPORATION AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (1972). For a summary of his 
career achievements and influence, see Henry G. Manne, ’52, 1928–2015, THE U. 
OF CHI. SCH. OF L., https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/henry-g-manne-52-1928-
2015 (last visited Sept. 5, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 239. See Manne, The Myth of Corporate Responsibility, supra note 237. 
 240. Comments by Panelists, 26 BUS. LAW. 549, 549–50 (1970) (emphasis 
added). 
 241. Id. Schwartz also stated: 
One would not debate troop withdrawal from Vietnam at a 
shareholders meeting, but [one] could argue over whether to sell 
napalm to the military. The morality of racism is not for a shareholder 
forum, but hiring policy and support for low cost housing is within the 
company’s jurisdiction. It seems to me that all of these less general 
matters can and should be debated by the board of directors and the 
shareholders. 
Donald E. Schwartz, Corporate Responsibility in the Age of Aquarius, 26 
BUS. LAW. 513, 524 (Nov. 1970). Schwartz, who described himself in the 
same article as a conservative, wrote: 
I believe the proxy machinery can and should assist in the process of 
bringing these issues before the corporate forum. The rules should be 
interpreted, as they were in the GM matter, to allow policy questions 
which have a social impact to come before the shareholder meeting, if 
the corporate body is empowered to take action on the question. I think 
that is also the thinking of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 
as seen from the dicta in the Dow case. 
1222 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1167 (2019) 
Indeed, Dow had never earned much profit from its production of 
napalm, and its executives justified their decision to make napalm 
on political and moral grounds. Manne, who authored a number of 
works critical of shareholder activism and corporate social 
responsibility in the 1960s and 1970s, never quite addressed 
Schwartz’s point.242 Where, in corporate democracy, is the line 
between the board’s business judgment and its political judgment? 
And what, exactly, is at stake in answering this question? 
With the benefit of nearly fifty subsequent proxy seasons, we 
can now say that concerns about the politicization of the firm 
turned out to be overwrought. The corporate annual meeting did 
not become a highly politicized circus after Medical Committee, and 
in the years that followed, the business press documented a return 
to the quiet, management-dominated annual meeting that had 
been the norm in the early 1960s. 
The federal courts in the D.C. Circuit would not be asked to 
consider the scope of the shareholder proposal rule again for nearly 
fifteen years. Yet, when the court revisited the rule—and a 
substantially different Subsection (5), which had been revised by 
the SEC to make it harder for shareholder-proponents to  
prevail—a district court, citing Medical Committee, would again 
hold in favor of the shareholder-proponent. In that case, 
Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 243 the district court held that 
the company had to include a shareholder proposal opposing the 
company’s practice of force-feeding geese to make foie gras.244 
2. Pushback from the Business Community and the SEC 
Business leaders responded to Medical Committee, Campaign 
GM, and the 1970 proxy season by pushing back. In his essay, “The 
Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits,” Milton 
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 242. Manne produced a cottage industry’s worth of articles decrying corporate 
social responsibility as ill-conceived. See his three-volume collected works, one 
whole volume of which is devoted to his writings that criticize corporate social 
responsibility, 1 HENRY G. MANNE, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF HENRY G. MANNE 
(Fred S. McChesney ed., 2009). 
 243. 618 F. Supp. 554 (D.C. 1985). 
 244. Id. 
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Friedman argued that the “newer phenomenon” of ESG 
shareholder activism involved “some stockholders trying to get 
other stockholders . . . to contribute against their will to ‘social’ 
causes favored by the activists.”245 Friedman’s essay is routinely 
excerpted in corporate law casebooks today, while the passages in 
the D.C. Circuit’s opinion that endorsed a robust concept of 
corporate democracy generally are not. 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Medical Committee, the 
SEC began a series of revisions that narrowed shareholders’ rights 
to bring proposals.246 The deadline for a shareholder to submit a 
proposal to the company was moved back from 60 days to 70 days 
(in 1972), to 90 days (in 1976) to 120 days (in 1983).247 The number 
of proposals a shareholder could submit at a company was reduced 
from an unlimited number to two proposals (in 1976) to one 
                                                                                                     
 245. Friedman, supra note 141. 
 246. The SEC set about to undercut the administrative law holding of the D.C. 
Circuit as well. In Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, the full 
Commission had reviewed the no-action determination by the staff of the Division 
of Corporation Finance; it was the Commission’s approval of the no-action letter 
that the D.C. Circuit had held was reviewable as a final order. Shortly after that 
case was decided by the D.C. Circuit, however, the SEC established a 
work-around: the Commission refused to consider an appeal of a no-action letter. 
In a 1974 case, Kixmiller v. SEC, the D.C. Circuit held that without a final 
determination by the Commission, there was no final order subject to judicial 
review. 492 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Thus, within just a few years, the D.C. 
Circuit had endorsed the SEC’s work-around, effectively cutting off the very 
avenue of judicial review that it had opened up for shareholders in 1970. Solomon, 
Schwartz, and Bauman noted in 1986 that after Medical Committee, the SEC 
made it a practice not to review staff no-action determinations. See LEWIS D. 
SOLOMON, DONALD E. SCHWARTZ & JEFFREY D. BAUMAN, CORPORATIONS LAW AND 
POLICY: MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 584 (2d ed. 1986). Today, when an investor 
seeks judicial review of a no-action letter on a shareholder proposal, it will seek 
declaratory or injunctive relief in federal district court. See, e.g., Trinity Wall St. 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 3d 617, 622 (D. Del. 2014) (describing Trinity 
Wall Street’s lawsuit in federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment, 
preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction). As a result, there is no longer 
any real question that a shareholder can obtain judicial review of a company’s 
decision to exclude a social or environmental shareholder proposal from its proxy 
statement. Id. 
  247. Compare Rule 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1969) (60 days) with Adoption of 
Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 9784, 1972 SEC LEXIS 
155, at *5–6 (Sept. 22, 1972) (70 days), and Adoption of Amendments Relating to 
Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 12,999, 1976 SEC 
LEXIS 326, at *8–16 (Nov. 22, 1976) (90 days), and Adoption of Amendments 
Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 34,20091, 
1983 SEC LEXIS 1011, at *11 (Aug. 16, 1983) (120 days). 
1224 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1167 (2019) 
proposal (in 1983).248 Shareholder “eligibility” requirements were 
imposed for the first time in 1983.249 Though it is difficult to 
quantify the effect of these incremental changes on shareholders’ 
activism, it is equally hard to imagine that they did not have an 
effect, particularly on the sort of investors most likely to demand 
social, environmental, and political reforms—those lacking 
economic resources and experience navigating the securities laws. 
3. Corporate Democracy in the Twenty-First Century 
Today, just as in the 1960s, progressive activists are 
dissatisfied with the responsiveness of democratic institutions to 
popular will and have turned to shareholder activism. The 2019 
proxy season calls to mind the shareholder activism of Medical 
Committee and others fifty years ago: at Walmart’s 2019 annual 
meeting, Bernie Sanders, a candidate for the presidency, appeared 
to demand that the company give a board seat to a representative 
of its workers.250 Alphabet, the parent company of Google, 
published thirteen shareholder proposals in its proxy statement, 
addressing the biggest issues facing Silicon Valley: election 
interference, sexual harassment, hate speech, gender pay gap, 
NDAs and mandatory arbitration, freedom of expression, Chinese 
                                                                                                     
  248. Compare Rule 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1969) (no limit) with Adoption of 
Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release 
No. 12,999, 1976 SEC LEXIS 326, at *15 (Nov. 22, 1976) (two proposals per 
corporation), and Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security 
Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 34,20091, 1983 SEC LEXIS 1011, at *12 (Aug. 
16, 1983) (one proposal per corporation). 
 249. Compare Rule 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1969) (no threshold), with Adoption 
of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release 
No. 34,20091, 1983 SEC LEXIS 1011, at *7–8 (Aug. 16, 1983) (stating that in 
order to submit a proposal “a proponent must own at least 1% or $1000 in market 
value of a security entitled to be voted at the meeting on the proposal and have 
held such securities for no less than one year prior to the date on which he submits 
the proposal”). The eligibility threshold was increased to $2,000 in 1998 to adjust 
for inflation. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-40018, 1998 SEC LEXIS 1001, at *44 (May 21, 1998). 
 250. See Laura Litvan, Matthew Boyle, & Bloomberg, Bernie Sanders Rips 
“Grotesque” Greed and “Starvation Wages” at Walmart Shareholder Meeting, 
FORBES (June 5, 2019), https://fortune.com/2019/06/05/bernie-sanders-walmart-
shareholder-meeting (last visited Sept. 11, 2019) (stating that Sanders called on 
Walmart to add employee representatives to its board of directors) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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censorship, sustainability, antitrust, and the corporate governance 
that insulates Google’s executives from shareholder 
accountability.251 The company’s management opposed all thirteen 
proposals and fought (unsuccessfully) to keep some of them off the 
ballot.252 One review of the 2019 proxy season found that fewer 
environmental, social, and political proposals were submitted than 
in 2018, but that more went to a shareholder vote, where they 
received greater voting support, on average, than a year earlier.253 
Fifty years after Medical Committee’s path-breaking activism, 
corporate America is experiencing a second wave of pressure from 
shareholders for social reforms. In this second wave of activism, 
shareholders are significantly more sophisticated than they were 
in the 1960s and 1970s, and some changes to the capital markets 
and to the securities laws have cut in their favor. As a result, a 
small number of ESG shareholder proposals win a majority of 
votes each year, and many more are settled between the company 
and activists, yielding a policy reform.254 Put simply, corporate 
democracy is shaping companies’ social, environmental, and 
political policies, though it has never achieved the “true vitality” 
that the D.C. Circuit imagined in Medical Committee for Human 
Rights v. SEC.  
                                                                                                     
 251. See ALPHABET INC., NOTICE OF 2019 ANNUAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS 
AND PROXY STATEMENT (Apr. 30, 2019), 
https://abc.xyz/investor/static/pdf/2019_alphabet_proxy_statement.pdf?cache=3e
d6a89. 
 252. See id. at 11 (indicating that the company’s board recommended voting 
against each proposal). 
  253. See 2019 Proxy Season Review: Part I Rule 14a-8 Shareholder Proposals, 
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, July 12, 2019, at 1, 
https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/SC-Publication-2019-Proxy-Season-
Review-Part-1-Rule-14a-8-Shareholder-Proposals.pdf (environmental, social, and 
political shareholder proposals dropped from 387 in 2018 to 323 in 2019, but more 
went to a vote, and average votes cast in favor rose from 26% to 28%). As I 
explained in a previous article, efforts to count shareholder proposals rely more 
on art than science, which explains why tallies of proposals differ from 
organization to organization. See Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal 
Settlements and the Private Ordering of Public Elections, 126 YALE L.J. 262, 277–
78 (2016). 
 254. See 2019 Proxy Season Review, supra note 253 (reporting that 9 
proposals on environmental, social, and political topics passed a shareholder vote 
in 2019, and 8 passed in 2018); see also Haan, supra note 253, at 277–86 
(describing the settlement of shareholder proposals). 
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At the same time, the Supreme Court has relied upon the 
existence of “corporate democracy” to justify the expansion of 
corporate political speech rights. A few years after declining to 
decide what corporate democracy meant in Medical Committee, the 
Supreme Court raised the subject of corporate democracy in 1978 
in First National Bank v. Bellotti.255 In that case, which focused on 
the First Amendment right of a corporation to spend money in 
support of a state ballot initiative unrelated to its business, the 
Supreme Court wrote that “[u]ltimately shareholders may decide, 
through the procedures of corporate democracy, whether their 
corporation should engage in debate on public issues.”256 It is not 
clear what the Court meant by this, since there was (and is) no 
corporate governance mechanism to decide whether a corporation 
engages in political speech, and corporate managers are not 
accountable to shareholders for individual political expenditures. 
The Court’s suggestion that the existence of “corporate democracy” 
in any form was sufficient to justify unfettered speech rights for 
corporations was puzzling in light of its own recent history. 
The Supreme Court made a similar move in Citizens United v. 
FEC,257 decades later, referencing corporate democracy first with 
regard to corporate speech rights, and then in connection with the 
constitutionality of campaign finance disclosure laws.258 With 
regard to corporate speech rights, the Court opined that there was 
“little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by shareholders 
‘through the procedures of corporate democracy.’”259 This 
assumption, it turned out, was predicated on the idea that 
shareholders have access to information about their company’s 
political spending, an assumption that was then and is now 
false.260 
                                                                                                     
 255. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). For a contemporary take on Bellotti, see Bowie, 
supra note 206 (“[C]orporations are fundamentally representative institutions, 
ones in which a vocal person purports to represent a silent group.”). 
 256. Id. at 794.  
 257. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
258. See id. at 362, 370 (describing shareholders utilizing corporate 
democracy in connection with corporate speech and campaign finance). 
 259. Id. at 361–62. 
260. See Peter Overby, Shareholders Want Political Spending Transparency, 
NPR (Feb. 28, 2012), https://www.npr.org/2012/02/28/147548228/shareholders-
want-political-spending-transparency (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) (reporting on the 
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The assumption became clear later in the opinion, when the 
Court wrote that “[s]hareholder objections raised through the 
procedures of corporate democracy can be more effective today 
because modern technology makes disclosures rapid and 
informative.”261 It explained further that:  
[w]ith the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of 
expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the 
information needed to hold corporations and elected officials 
accountable for their positions and supporters. Shareholders 
can determine whether their corporation’s political speech 
advances the corporation’s interest in making profits, and 
citizens can see whether elected officials are ‘‘‘in the pocket’ of 
so-called moneyed interests.”262 
The passage suggested that the Court viewed “the procedures 
of corporate democracy” as related only to “the corporation’s 
interest in making profits,” a crabbed view of corporate democracy 
that shareholder activists in the Medical Committee mold would 
never have endorsed.263 Judge Tamm, who authored the D.C. 
Circuit’s opinion in Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 
would not have endorsed it either.  He had found “[n]o reason” why 
federal law shouldn’t be interpreted to require a discussion at the 
annual meeting on social responsibility versus profitability, when 
a shareholder demanded it.264 Fifty years after Medical Committee 
submitted its first qualifying proposal to Dow, there remains 
uncertainty about the rights of shareholders to shape companies’ 
social, political, and environmental policies, and about the very 
nature of corporate democracy itself. 
V. Conclusion 
The story of Medical Committee’s battle with Dow over its 
production of napalm lies at the intersection of civil rights history 
                                                                                                     
debate regarding whether corporations should have to disclose spending on 
politics and lobbying) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 261. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370. 
 262. Id. (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 259 (2003)). 
 263. Id. at 362, 370 (internal quotations omitted). 
 264. Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 681 (D.C. Cir. 
1970). 
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and corporate governance history. As civil rights history, the case 
is a curiosity. Medical Committee was a minor civil rights 
organization with major accomplishments, but in the final 
retelling of its history, its contributions to shareholder activism 
have been left out. Although Medical Committee lost its battle with 
Dow in the U.S. Supreme Court and even at the corporate ballot 
box, it catalyzed a broader movement of shareholder activism, one 
that has advanced over the decades in fits and starts but is now 
strong.265 Medical Committee’s victory in the D.C. Court of Appeals 
was a major shot across the bow of corporate managers, and the 
organization’s efforts should be remembered as an important 
legacy of that group of doctors and nurses who pursued multiple 
avenues of reform: grass-roots activism, local health clinics, 
legislative advocacy, and, yes, shareholder activism. In this sense, 
Medical Committee responded uniquely to Martin Luther King 
Jr.’s call-to-arms, in his 1967 speech in Riverside Church, to seek 
out “every creative method of protest possible.”266  
As corporate governance history, Medical Committee’s conflict 
with Dow marks a key point in fifty years of legal wrangling over 
the meaning of corporate democracy. It also revealed the  
final—and ultimately unsuccessful—efforts of a group of aging 
New Deal securities lawyers to impose greater accountability over 
corporations and their managers. These New Deal lawyers 
included Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, the former 
SEC chair, who had once proposed that corporate boards should 
have “public” directors, but who left little trace of his progressive 
corporate philosophy in the case law when he retired from the 
Court in 1975.  
As a novice shareholder activist, Medical Committee came 
close to establishing, under federal law, that corporations must 
publish shareholders’ proposals on so-called “social” (or “political”) 
matters in the proxy and hold a vote. A unanimous three-judge 
panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that Medical 
Committee likely had that right as a Dow shareholder.267 Due to 
vacancies on the U.S. Supreme Court, SEC v. Medical Committee 
                                                                                                     
265. See supra Part III. 
266. Martin Luther King, Jr., Speech at Riverside Church, New York, New 
York: Beyond Vietnam (Apr. 4, 1967). 
267. Supra note 8. 
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for Human Rights was decided by only seven Justices, and it 
appears that three of the seven were supportive of judicial review 
of no-action letters and expanded shareholder rights.268 After the 
confirmation of Justices Powell and Rehnquist at the beginning of 
1972, however, the Court’s balance of power on these issues 
shifted. Just a few years later, “corporate democracy” was being 
cited not to empower shareholders, but to justify an expansion of 
corporate speech rights.269 
It is impossible to say how the case might have come out if the 
SEC had not successfully pressed a last-minute mootness 
argument. What we can say is that an early opportunity for the 
Supreme Court to expound on corporate democracy was lost in 
1972. In the nearly fifty years that have passed since the Supreme 
Court punted in SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights, the 
concept of corporate democracy has grown in importance and 
obscurity. If shareholder activism continues to surge, the Supreme 
Court may eventually get a chance to revisit the subject, and to 
rule on it for the first time. 
                                                                                                     
268. See supra notes 169–178 and accompanying text. 
269. See supra Part IV. 
